Watch List 2025 Map
EU Watch List / Global 20+ minutes

Watch List 2025

Crisis Group’s Watch List identifies ten countries facing deadly conflict, humanitarian emergency or other crises in 2025. In these places, early action, driven or supported by the EU and its member states, could save lives and enhance prospects for stability.

Table of Contents

Africa

Asia

Europe and Central Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

Middle East and North Africa

President’s Take: The Dilemmas Trump Poses for Europe

Donald Trump’s return to the White House will have global repercussions, but for Europe the impact may be profound. Washington is certainly not omnipotent; indeed, Trump’s assertiveness may well run aground on the reality of a more multipolar world. Much, too, remains uncertain about his administration’s direction in many of the world’s hotspots. Still, the new U.S. president will undoubtedly cast a long shadow over world affairs in 2025. At a time when Europe is confronting a belligerent Russia as well as grappling with economic woes, defence challenges and internal threats to cohesion from populism, a U.S. leader questioning the decades-old trans-Atlantic alliance and throwing his weight around to get what he wants seems set to pose big dilemmas for his European counterparts. 

Trump’s first days in office have offered plenty to worry about. There is the sequence of executive actions, pardoning rioters who stormed the U.S. Capitol on 6 January 2021; suspending up to $3 trillion in federal funding for ostensibly “woke” programs (an effort stayed by the courts); stripping at-risk former officials of their security details; and taking aim at initiatives designed to promote diversity, protect transgender rights and provide support for refugees legally in the United States. Trump has threatened to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal; insisted that Canada become the 51st state; floated Palestinians’ forced relocation; threatened to shove Colombia off an economic cliff (when it refused to clear U.S. military planes carrying expelled migrants); and frozen most U.S. aid, albeit with carveouts for life-saving humanitarian assistance. He is now saying he will refurbish a migrant operations centre in the U.S. compound at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba so that it can hold as many as 30,000 souls.

Everything suggests, this time around, a more powerful executive from the start. Backed by big tech and Congress and operating under the Supreme Court’s generous interpretation of presidential immunity, Trump is largely unchecked at home and brasher about pursuing aims abroad. The president’s words alone deepen an already rife sense of global lawlessness. Expressions of intent to seize parts of other countries, in particular, further strain a norm barring territorial conquest that remains the bedrock of international order but that Russia’s land grab in Ukraine and Israel’s encroachment on the Golan Heights have already done much to erode.

Still, Trump’s foreign policies for now mostly remain uncertain, the signals his own statements and those of his officials send mixed. Hawkishness among several top officials sits alongside Trump’s own aversion to military entanglements abroad and, perhaps, an eye to dealmaking. Notably, too, Trump so far has mostly menaced allies and partners, who rely on Washington and are keen to stay in its good graces. The test will come when he attempts to push around near-peer U.S. rivals. Forcing concessions from adversaries tends to be a tougher proposition. 

As Crisis Group’s Trustee Ivan Krastev has advised, it is “paramount for Europe in this hostile environment [to] never to behave like a victim”, since Trump will tend to pick on those who appear to be easy targets. Europe, it is true, is hardly weak, comprising some of the world’s biggest economies and two nuclear powers. A recent survey by the European Council of Foreign Relations suggests that “many in the world regard the EU as a player equal to the U.S. and China”. Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte have all started their terms in positions of strength. Italian premier Giorgia Meloni, who thus far is firmly supporting aid to Ukraine despite hard-right leanings that have made other leaders sceptical of it, appears to have Trump’s ear. At January’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Von der Leyen stressed the EU’s economic muscle and options. Brussels plans summits with South Africa, Central Asian states, Brazil and Japan, alongside a big Commission visit to India to advance trade talks. Von der Leyen also emphasised that “Europe has too often outsourced its security” and that “those days are gone”.  

Trump sets up particularly acute challenges for the continent.

But Trump sets up particularly acute challenges for the continent. Russia’s aggression has exposed how much Europe still relies militarily upon Washington, with U.S. arms and ammunition supplies critical to Kyiv’s defence. Plus, economic doldrums make European capitals all the more vulnerable to U.S. threats of tariffs, hinder necessary defence spending and fuel polarisation and populism, which make maintaining EU unity all the harder. A series of elections, including in France, Germany, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Ireland, may complicate the task of preserving consensus, especially if Euro-sceptic, hard-right parties gain ground. Potentially turbulent politics in France, Germany and Poland, and frosty relations between Berlin and Paris, add to the problems (though a new German government may allow Berlin, Paris – and Warsaw – to patch things up). 

Besides, no rulebook exists for treading the right line between holding firm when necessary – as Greenland’s prime minister has done so far in response to Trump’s provocations – without unnecessarily antagonising an ally on whom the continent still depends for its security. For good reason, representatives of Poland, which has taken over the rotating EU Council Presidency from January until June, speak of “the most difficult six months in decades”.

When it comes to crisis management, as this Watch List shows, President Trump poses different challenges for European leaders in different places. First, and inevitably Europe’s priority, is the continent’s own security. Both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin seem more intent on meeting each other than on including Ukraine and Europe in discussions that will shape their future. European capitals may well worry that Trump will abandon Ukraine, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, weaken NATO by casting further doubt upon Washington’s mutual defence commitments or even tie discussions about Greenland, Ukraine and European security together, perhaps with trade pressure thrown in for good measure. 

Thankfully, at least some U.S. officials appear to recognise that, even if a deal freezes front lines in Ukraine, Kyiv needs deterrence against further Russian aggression and that enervating NATO would be destabilising. (What happens in Ukraine is vital as well for Moldova, which might be next in the Kremlin’s line of fire should it succeed in cowing Kyiv.) The challenge for Europe is ensuring that Ukraine’s and its interests are represented in talks, if they happen, and, more broadly, that in exchange for European capitals pledging to dramatically step up – even if at a lower rate than the 5 per cent of GDP that Trump now demands – in reinforcing Europe’s own defences, Washington allows time for that to happen.

Europe ... should do what it can to nudge the new [U.S.] administration in a constructive direction.

Second are other crises where Washington’s role is likely pivotal and where Europe, in concert with others, should do what it can to nudge the new administration in a constructive direction, reinforcing positive moves the U.S. makes or containing the damage if it goes the other way. In the Middle East, Trump was decisive in getting the Gaza ceasefire and some officials still appear to hold out hope of a normalisation deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which Riyadh insists would require Palestinian statehood. But several cabinet members back Israel’s expansion in the West Bank and, if things go down that road, Europe will have to overcome its disunity and work with Arab governments against steps that permanently foreclose Palestinian self-determination. 

On Iran, ideally the new administration would test what it can get through diplomacy first, something the EU should back, but if not, then European capitals should at least work to tie extra pressure on Iran, including the threat of reimposing UN sanctions, to realistic political ends. Regarding the Korean peninsula, with North Korean troops in Russia’s Kursk region, and non-proliferation principles at stake, Europeans might view warily any move toward talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. But if such dialogue could lower the risk of nuclear war on the peninsula, then on balance a supportive posture would make sense. Overall, engagement with adversaries might slow the advance of an anti-Western axis that collaborates to thwart pursuit of U.S. and European interests. 

Then there are places outside the White House’s main focus, where Washington may well end up less engaged but that matter for Europe and where European leaders, working with others, might have more space to act. In Sudan, for example, European capitals could step up in the coming months to pick up the likely diplomatic slack from the U.S., leveraging their ties with Egypt, as well as the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf Arab states, and supporting Turkish diplomacy, which for now appears to offer the most promising track. In the Great Lakes, the EU should assist the region in exerting greater pressure on Rwanda to accept a deal to withdraw the M23 rebels from Goma, with its troops and proxies desisting from further advances, and on the Democratic Republic of Congo’s government to enter talks with the M23. In Bangladesh, where U.S. action may be limited, the EU has a rare opportunity to support a democratic transition (of which these days there are few) in a geopolitically vital region. In Syria, the U.S. may be active in some parts, such as in the north east, but leave reconstruction and governance support to others. In Colombia, which started 2025 with a spike in violence on the border with Venezuela, the EU can help achieve local peace deals. Globally, many countries will appreciate efforts by the EU to fill gaps left by recent U.S. aid cuts.

Europe is no stranger to systemic and even existential crises. The bloc has repeatedly shown itself to be resilient and able to muster bold collective responses to emergencies, whether the financial and debt crises, the COVID-19 pandemic and, at least thus far, Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine. True, the threats the continent faces today are of a magnitude unmatched for decades. But if it can weather the immediate challenges ahead, even if only by muddling through, it may emerge stronger. That will depend not only on how wisely its leaders handle what looks certain to be a tricky relationship with Washington and how they deal with their own domestic politics. Mostly, it hinges on whether Trump’s second term prompts European capitals to react as they should have done the first time around: with far greater urgency in standing together to protect the continent’s interests, whether by bolstering Europe’s own defence or by using the considerable collective sway they still enjoy to help manage crises in the main arenas of strategic competition and, especially, away from those places. 

Africa

Turbulence in the DRC Raises Hard Questions for the EU

As 2025 begins, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is engulfed in crisis. Following weeks of intense fighting, rebels seized control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, on 27 January. For several years, the conflict has pitted the national armed forces – allied with a motley coalition of local militias known as Wazalendo (“patriots” in Kiswahili), a southern African regional force and the Burundian army – against the M23 rebels, who are supported by the Rwandan army and launched an offensive in November 2021. The fall of Goma came following earlier M23 and Rwandan advances: their forces captured the strategically valuable town of Masisi on 7 January and then the town of Sake, just 25km from the provincial capital, on 23 January. Since they took Goma as well, diplomats have been considering both the city’s short-term future and the longer-term prospects of the DRC’s east. 

In addition to the long-running war, two issues are vitally important for relations between Kinshasa and Brussels. First, tensions are mounting between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and the opposition over his plans to change the constitution and potentially remove the current two-term limit so as to extend his stay in office. Secondly, while Europe is interested in enhancing its access to the DRC’s minerals, these remain a source of corruption and illicit financial flows that are hurting the country’s development.

The EU and its member states could usefully pursue the following priorities:

  • Continue offering African mediators robust support, especially through the new EU special representative for the Great Lakes, including by pressing Rwanda to accept a deal to withdraw the M23 from Goma, with its troops and proxies desisting from further advances. 

  • If Rwanda maintains its aggressive military posture, and hence fails to abide by the conditions Brussels set out regarding EU financial support for its military operations in Mozambique, Brussels should withdraw its support for the Rwandan army mission to signal its growing concern about the escalating conflict in North Kivu.

  • Provide increased funding to the humanitarian response in North Kivu, especially in light of violence that has sent tens of thousands more people fleeing to displacement camps around Goma.

  • Support the DRC’s civil society and church bodies as they seek to oppose any constitutional change that may stir up instability. Urge other African powers to support constitutional change solely on the basis of genuine national consensus.

  • Supplement the 2023 Great Lakes strategy, which aims to promote sustainable mining, with measures to discourage corruption and illicit financial flows that prevent the Congolese people from reaping the benefits of the country’s mineral boom and deepen dangerous political divides.

A woman from the Masisi territory, who lost her husband and all their possessions during their escape, poses after finding a new lodging in an abandoned shelter in the Bulengo displaced persons camp, near Goma, North-Kivu province, on January 15, 2025. Jospin Mwisha / AFP

African Mediation Flounders as Goma Falls

In 2022, the African Union invited Angola’s President João Lourenço to mediate the conflict between Kigali and Kinshasa stemming from fighting in the eastern DRC, in what became known as the Luanda process. While the three leaders did hammer out a ceasefire in July 2024, it collapsed shortly thereafter. A planned tripartite presidential summit scheduled for mid-December was scotched amid mud-slinging between the Congolese and Rwandan presidents. 

The main point of contention is the Democratic Liberation Front of Rwanda (FDLR in French), an anti-Kigali group that has sought refuge in the DRC and has allies in the Congolese army. Rwandan President Paul Kagame wants Kinshasa to tamp down on the rebels. In addition, he wants the DRC’s government to negotiate with the M23, as part of his contention that the North Kivu crisis is a purely domestic Congolese one. Kinshasa, in turn, refuses to talk to the M23, which it sees as a Rwandan stooge, and argues that it is the victim of international aggression. 

With the peace process in disarray, fighting resumed in the eastern DRC in December 2024, leading to the fall of Goma. The M23 rebels first extended their gains in North Kivu and on 4 January seized Masisi, the centre of the province’s lucrative gold and coltan mining industry, most of whose output is now exported directly to Rwanda, according to Crisis Group sources and the UN. On 23 January, they seized the strategic town of Sake, close to Goma. Over the next days, they advanced, taking over Goma on 27 and 28 January. While some DRC army and southern African forces held out, especially around the airport, the city fell without massive bloodshed as most of the Congolese soldiers and militiamen surrendered or fled. But with M23 rebels advancing farther into neighbouring South Kivu province in the course of January, the risk of a widening conflict remains. 

The fighting has thrown millions out of their homes and caused the number of cases of sexual and gender-based violence to soar. Women and girls have particularly suffered both from predatory acts by armed men on all sides and from their vulnerable positions in displacement camps. In addition to their advances, the Rwandan forces and the M23 are beginning to remake the areas under their de facto control by embedding their own administrations and pushing out local civilian leaders who oppose them. 

Brussels has called on Kigali to cut its support for the M23 and withdraw its forces from Congolese territory. It has sanctioned some lower-ranking Rwandan officers.

The EU has frequently voiced its support for the Luanda process but has been divided behind the scenes, especially as concerns relations with Rwanda. Brussels has called on Kigali to cut its support for the M23 and withdraw its forces from Congolese territory. It has sanctioned some lower-ranking Rwandan officers. It has also prodded Kinshasa to sever ties with the FDLR. 

But Kinshasa wants the EU to go further and put tougher sanctions on Rwanda for invading Congolese territory. That the EU has not taken this step so far is partly due to Rwanda’s efforts to promote its own account of the conflict in European capitals, namely, that its deployment is a reaction to the FDLR threat and dangerous rhetoric coming from Kinshasa. This narrative does not square with events in the eastern DRC, however, given that Rwanda has been intervening since 2021 and that its moves to grab mineral-rich regions do not serve the professed objective of tamping down the FDLR. Many European diplomats nevertheless remain keen to continue cooperating with Kigali, which is helping fight an Islamic insurgency in Mozambique, with some success. They want to play down Rwanda’s misdeeds or at least isolate them from its other activities. In giving financial support to the Rwandan army in Mozambique, Brussels set conditions including Rwandan participation in the Luanda process, but even some EU staff Crisis Group has consulted admit that these conditions are hardly enforced. 

It remains unclear at this point whether the invasion of Goma will change European calculations. But some recent signs, for example the EU’s forceful statements of 6 January and 25 January during the battle for Goma, suggest that its position may be hardening in the face of Rwandan actions. As news of the city’s fall reached the Congolese public, protests broke out in major cities, including Kinshasa, as citizens vented their anger at the government for its failures, but also at Western powers seen as backing Rwanda. Protesters targeted offices of European embassies, underlining how sensitive the issue is between Brussels and Kinshasa. 

The Dilemmas of a Mineral Boom

Kinshasa is enjoying a windfall from surging prices for minerals used in the production of high-tech goods – in particular batteries – including in the EU. The country produces 5 per cent of the world’s copper and has 60 per cent of the world’s known cobalt reserves. Production levels, moreover, are rising rapidly. 

The DRC’s mineral boom, however, risks deepening the country’s divides. Most industrial mining occurs in the Katanga region, where many elites are already frustrated with what they view as the government’s electoral malpractice in 2023. Those polls saw President Tshisekedi’s allies from outside the province win key provincial positions, depriving local elites of posts that would allow them to maintain a foothold in mining and associated logistics businesses. While not as unstable as North and South Kivu provinces, the region has experienced political violence. In early 2024, two Katangan political heavyweights – former President Joseph Kabila and former Katanga provincial governor Moïse Katumbi – made a joint vow to oppose Tshisekedi’s plans to change the constitution (see below). A widespread perception that Tshisekedi’s allies are using ties to the government in Kinshasa to push into the mining sector with little regard for rule of law or tax obligations, alongside wider national concerns about corruption, has hardened the confrontation with Katangan elites. 

Getting access to these minerals while ensuring “sustainable” supply chains ... is central to EU policy and its 2023 Great Lakes strategy.

Getting access to these minerals while ensuring “sustainable” supply chains – essentially, operations that minimise the extractive industry’s environmental damage and ensure livelihoods for people living in mining areas – is central to EU policy and its 2023 Great Lakes strategy. The EU is co-funding the first G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment initiative to support the development of the Lobito corridor, a 1,300km railway line connecting the DRC, Zambia and Angola to global markets via the port of Lobito; the hope is to transport critical raw materials and strategic minerals from the region to the EU. 

Brussels, however, faces major obstacles in establishing a foothold in the DRC’s mining industry. First, China has a massive head start in the sector and dominates the supply chain, from mining sites through shipping to end use. Secondly, the notoriously slow process by which contracts are awarded in the DRC requires political influence. The EU’s ability to wield such influence is severely hampered by disputes over whether it has given too much support to Rwanda. 

The difficulties in obtaining Kinshasa’s approval were exacerbated at the start of 2024, when Brussels signed a memorandum on supporting trade in key minerals with Kigali. Although some experts Crisis Group spoke to thought the text could be a useful starting point for more transparent sourcing of minerals, Kinshasa was furious with the deal, arguing that Rwanda produces very few critical minerals of its own but is known to sell those smuggled from the territories it now controls in the eastern DRC. Disputes such as these over relations with Kigali have soured relations between Kinshasa and Brussels; they account for the cold shoulder Congolese ministers gave the new EU special envoy on his first visit to Kinshasa in October 2024. Brussels and European countries face an uphill climb to win the favour of key politicians that they need to make inroads into the mining sector. 

A Looming Constitutional Crisis

As war rages in the east and tensions mount in Katanga, the country faces a serious, and growing, political crisis caused by Tshisekedi’s moves to revise the 2006 constitution. Having comfortably won the December 2023 election, the emboldened president has announced formation of a commission to look into changing the national charter, which he says needs updating to reflect the DRC’s contemporary challenges. Opposition parties and the influential Catholic Church, however, say the commission is part of an attempt to stay in power beyond the current limit of two presidential terms. 

Few doubt that the move could upset the DRC’s delicate political balance and engender fierce resistance. Although they are divided and have a weak position in parliament and the provinces, opposition parties know they can unite on this issue and use it to mobilise popular discontent. Both they and civil society also know that a public outcry (including from within Tshisekedi’s own party), leading to violent protests and fears of cracks in the security forces, helped prevent Tshisekedi’s predecessor, Kabila, from staying in power after his second term ended in 2018. Another reason to avoid changing the constitution is that anti-Kinshasa rebels, including the M23, have already used the move to further their arguments that the DRC’s national government lacks legitimacy. 

What the EU and Its Member States Can Do

The fall of Goma, combined with Tshisekedi’s potential gambit to cling to power, has contributed to growing alarm in the DRC. These developments present the EU with a series of challenges in 2025 and beyond. The first of these revolves around its position toward Rwanda. The EU has rightly called out Rwandan forces’ presence in the DRC and their role in invading Goma in January, trying to maintain a balance between condemning Rwandan actions and censuring Kinshasa’s unwillingness to deal with the FDLR, while also supporting Rwanda’s military deployment in Mozambique. But with mounting evidence that Rwanda is not just confronting hostile armed groups on the DRC’s side of the border but de facto annexing large parts of the DRC’s territory, the EU needs to increase its pressure on Kigali. 

A firmer stance against Rwanda’s aggression would emphasise important principles of non-interference and territorial integrity.

A firmer stance against Rwanda’s aggression would emphasise important principles of non-interference and territorial integrity, and help support African mediation with a view to an eventual M23 departure from Goma and then a Rwandan withdrawal from Congolese soil. It could also help improve relations with Kinshasa. As the crisis in North Kivu enters its fourth year, the EU should review its cooperation with Kigali and monitor more firmly whether Kigali abides by the conditions Brussels imposed for its support for the Rwandan army’s intervention in Mozambique, pulling back that support if there is no meaningful change in Rwanda’s actions in the DRC. While the EU’s support for Rwanda’s intervention in Mozambique is limited – in 2024, the EU agreed to provide a second tranche of €20 million – ending it may nevertheless send an important political and diplomatic signal to Kigali. At the same time, the EU should step up its support for humanitarian relief aimed at taking care of the displaced in North Kivu.

Secondly, European diplomats will have to consider when and how to take a position on the prospect of constitutional change. Many will want to wait as long as possible, avoiding public statements, as they are apprehensive about intervening in such a sensitive internal matter and unsure about how the issue will play out in the DRC or among other African powers. These concerns are understandable, but eventually it is likely that the EU will be pulled into the mêlée, as it was when Kabila’s reluctance to leave office threatened to torpedo the DRC’s stability. At that point, the EU sanctioned officials responsible for delaying the handover of power under the terms of the constitution. For the moment, the EU would be best advised to intensify consultations with African leaders and institutions and aim to support the creation of a wide international front in support of blocking any constitutional change that lacks broad domestic backing and could threaten national and regional stability. It should also offer support to Congolese church and civil society groups who are pushing in that same direction.

Finally, the EU’s eagerness to enter the DRC’s mineral sector comes with risks, whether in the form of strengthening relations with corrupt politicians or deepening the perception of preferential treatment of Kigali. Brussels can seek to at least partly mitigate these risks by furthering its work on responsibly sourcing mineral supplies. Already, the EU and European countries support projects in the DRC aimed at improving transparency and tackling corruption. Such initiatives are welcome, even if results are hard to quantify. Brussels could expand this work, for example by supporting Congolese whistleblowers. The EU should also reinforce safeguards against the flow of illicit funds into the European banking and property sectors. 

Bolstering Efforts to End Sudan’s Civil War

Sudan’s ruinous civil war rages on with no end in sight. The conflict that began in April 2023 is causing untold human misery, with tens of thousands killed and millions uprooted from their homes. Famine was declared in North Darfur in August 2024, and the UN has warned that the hunger crisis could be one of the worst in modern history. Sudan is increasingly divided into zones of control, with one of the main belligerents, the Sudanese army, holding the north and most parts of the east, while the other, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), dominate the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan. The capital, Khartoum, remains a war zone, mostly under the RSF’s sway, though the army is regaining ground. Despite a resurgence for the army, which took back Wad Medani, capital of the Gezira state and an agricultural and trading hub, in early January, and much of greater Khartoum late in the month, neither side appears able to achieve victory. That means the war could drag on even longer, destabilising neighbouring countries and exacting an ever greater toll on the Sudanese people. Outside powers, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the RSF’s chief backer, and Egypt, which supports the army, are fuelling the hostilities. 

Diplomatic efforts to end the war have not been equal to the moment. Attempts to foster talks between the two warring parties have mostly stumbled just past the starting line. A crucial problem has been the failure of external players to push their allies toward serious negotiations. Western powers, including the U.S., have sought to organise new talks, but with little success. The latest actor to take up the mediation mantle, Türkiye, will need help to make progress where others have faltered. 

To bolster negotiations and help avert further humanitarian catastrophe, the EU and its member states should:

  • Support mediators, including those with the Ankara-led initiative, working to halt the fighting. Make full use of European ties with the Gulf states and Egypt (which have strengthened over the past year) to nudge the belligerents to the table;

  • Form a contact group of EU foreign ministers to coordinate member state diplomacy and highlight the need for Europe to be more engaged in efforts to resolve the conflict;

  • Maintain or increase humanitarian spending on Sudan, and in affected regions of Chad, including by pushing member states to honour commitments made at the April 2024 Paris conference; and work with all influential outside parties to press for greater humanitarian access; 

  • Support existing efforts, including those by the African Union (AU), to encourage dialogue among Sudan’s political and civil society groups about a stable post-war future, including a substantial role for civilians. 

Women wait to collect food at a location set up by a local humanitarian organisation for people displaced by the war in Sudan, in Meroe in the country’s Northern State, on January 9, 2025. AFP

An Intractable Conflict

The war that has now consumed much of the country began in Khartoum. In 2019, after the military ousted former President Omar al-Bashir on the back of months of popular protests, the leaders of the army and RSF – Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, respectively – moved swiftly to fill the void at the apex of the Sudanese state. They each took top positions on the Sovereign Council, an eleven-member military-civilian body that assumed the head of state role during the post-Bashir transition. As chair and vice chair, Burhan and Hemedti wielded the real power, with a transitional civilian government led by technocratic Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok tasked with running the country. In October 2021, they banded together to carry out a coup removing that government.

Burhan and Hemedti’s subsequent cohabitation lasted little more than a year. By early 2023, relations between the two had deteriorated, leading to a tense standoff that escalated into armed conflict that April. At first, fighting was mostly confined to Khartoum and its surroundings, allowing for hopes that it could conclude swiftly. Saudi Arabia, alongside the U.S., attempted to broker a ceasefire that May, leading to the Jeddah Declaration, an agreement that sought to protect non-combatants and civilian infrastructure. The accord also required the sides to allow unrestricted humanitarian access. The belligerents soon violated it, however, and talks broke down. The conflict then spread into Darfur, with the RSF and affiliated Arab militias taking control of El Geneina, capital of West Darfur, in June. Rights groups recorded the killing of thousands of Masalit, a non-Arab ethnic group, by the RSF. By December, the RSF had taken control of all five states in Darfur. There have been reports of widespread sexual violence, mostly targeting women and girls, in Darfur and other parts of the country where combat has been at its most intense. 

A second round of Jeddah talks fared little better than the first, with the two sides blaming each other when they failed. In January 2024, the intelligence services of Egypt and the UAE convened a face-to-face meeting in Manama, Bahrain. These back-channel negotiations brought together Abdelrahim Dagalo, Hemedti’s deputy (and brother), and Shams al-Din Kabbashi, Burhan’s deputy. They, too, fizzled out when news of the meeting leaked and Burhan recalled Kabbashi. 

The outgoing Biden administration imposed sanctions on the leaders of the RSF and the Sudanese army ... for the sometimes criminal conduct of their forces.

In early 2024, the U.S. decided to involve itself more deeply in resolving the conflict, appointing a special envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello. The U.S. first sought to hold a new round of talks in Jeddah, including the UAE and Egypt. When these did not happen, they marshalled another new initiative in Geneva, co-hosted by Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, with Egypt and the UAE attending as observers. Once again, the effort was unsuccessful in bringing the belligerents together for talks. In January 2025, the outgoing Biden administration imposed sanctions on the leaders of the RSF and the Sudanese army – Hemedti and Burhan, respectively – deeming them responsible for the sometimes criminal conduct of their forces during the conflict.

Meanwhile, after a pause of more than two months during the rainy season, the army in September 2024 launched offensives to retake parts of Khartoum and Bahri, the capital’s sprawling northern suburb. The assaults were partly successful, but the gains were small, and most of the city remains in the RSF’s hands. The army made more headway in Sennar, a state in eastern Sudan. It retook the Jebel Moya area, a key transport hub, before seizing Sinjah, the state capital. The RSF withdrew from Sennar, redeploying its forces into neighbouring White Nile state, which borders South Sudan. In early January 2025, the momentum shifted in the army’s favour again when it retook Wad Medani, which the RSF had captured in a surprise offensive in December 2023. The army has now moved back into Khartoum from several directions as the RSF has lost ground. Fighting has also continued in North Darfur, particularly around the state capital, El Fasher. The Joint Darfur Force, made up of local armed groups aligned with the army, has been battling the RSF in areas to the north and east of the city. 

In December 2024, Türkiye offered to mediate new talks between the Sudanese army and the UAE, the RSF’s key backer. Yet Ankara’s efforts, while worthy of support, may encounter the same difficulties as previous attempts coordinated by the U.S. or Saudi Arabia – principally, the difficulty of marshalling various external interests to push the warring parties toward negotiations. 

Trouble for the Neighbourhood

On top of the war’s disastrous impact in Sudan, the effects on Sudan’s neighbours are also severe, risking the stability of already fragile countries. South Sudan’s economy has been pushed to the brink. In February 2024, the main pipeline transporting oil north from South Sudan’s Upper Nile state to a Sudanese terminal at Port Sudan ruptured, causing a complete shutdown. The pipeline carries about three quarters of South Sudan’s oil for export, with oil revenues comprising roughly 80 per cent of the government’s budget. Fixing the pipeline is technically possible, but it has proven difficult for Juba to make agreements with the army and RSF on restarting production and export, including fees for transit through territory under their control. The pipeline has been closed for nearly a year, putting increasing pressure on South Sudan’s economy that could have explosive political consequences. 

More than 900,000 Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees have arrived in Chad since April 2023 – most of them now reside in Ouaddaï, an impoverished eastern province – a development that could have destabilising effects. Chad has reportedly allowed the UAE to send arms to the RSF via logistical hubs on its territory. The Chadian government’s alliance with the UAE, which in June 2023 agreed to loan $1.5 billion to N’Djamena, has caused disquiet, particularly among the president’s Zaghawa tribe, who see the RSF as targeting their Sudanese brethren across the border in Darfur. 

The war is also causing security concerns for Ethiopia and Eritrea along their western borders. For Addis Ababa, which has not shown its hand in the conflict (despite apparently leaning toward the RSF’s patron, the UAE), the main risk is that the insurgency in the Amhara region will overlap with fighting in Sudan’s eastern states, with arms and militants crossing the frontier. Asmara, on the other hand, distrusts Emirati influence in the region and favours the Sudanese army. It has been training Sudanese militias in Eritrea to battle the RSF, according to regional and Western diplomats. 

Competing Interests

In part due to its geostrategic location, Sudan is of deep interest to several external powers whose involvement has both fuelled the war and complicated peace efforts. The RSF has received substantial support from the UAE, which has built up enormous influence across the Horn of Africa in recent years and covets a Red Sea port. In contrast, Sudan’s army has garnered backing from Egypt, which sees its southern neighbour’s stability as crucial to its national security. Other regional actors, including Qatar and Türkiye, sympathise with the army, with Ankara being home to Islamist figures including Bashir-era officials. Iran has supplied drones to the army. Saudi Arabia holds sway over both sides, but its chief concern is maintaining stability in the Red Sea basin and not losing clout to the UAE in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. The UAE-Egypt relationship is crucial, as each nation has significant leverage over the faction it favours. Abu Dhabi and Cairo have close bilateral ties of their own, but because their ambitions in Sudan clash, they have been unable to cooperate in resolving the conflict.

The involvement of several external states with competing interests has made it difficult to find a path to peace drawing on broad foreign support. Achieving a resolution will require not only ending hostilities in Sudan but also addressing the tangled web of regional influence. 

What the EU and Its Member States Can Do

Sudan matters for the EU and its member states. Beside the terrible humanitarian crisis, a long war in one of Africa’s biggest countries will radiate instability well beyond the region and into the Mediterranean basin. Sudan also abuts the Red Sea, a maritime corridor that during the Gaza conflict was severely disrupted by attacks on shipping from the Houthis in Yemen, causing the EU to deploy a naval mission (following the announcement of a ceasefire, the Houthis have said their strikes will continue only on Israeli vessels). The Sudan war has intensified a struggle for access to Port Sudan, involving external powers including Russia and Iran, which all seek a foothold near a sea route that is disproportionately important to Europe’s economic fortunes. Moreover, should Sudan’s war further roil neighbours such as Chad and South Sudan, thousands of fleeing people may arrive on Europe’s shores, where migration is a politically loaded issue. 

For these reasons, the EU and its member states should in concert support efforts to end a conflict that has not ranked high on the agenda of many powers, including Brussels, due to the attention devoted to wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Europe may especially need to step up in the coming months to pick up the likely diplomatic slack from the U.S., where the Trump administration has signalled little interest in Sudan. To this end, the EU should rally its members to support the new Ankara-led mediation track or any other that picks up momentum. It should also hold back from following Washington’s lead and imposing sanctions on the leaders of the warring parties unless they are attached to a clear political strategy, coordinated with partners, for ending the war.

Although it has limited leverage over the key players, the EU has over the past year made efforts to deepen its cooperation with the UAE, bilaterally and through the Gulf Cooperation Council (with the first ever EU-GCC summit to take place in October), and with Egypt, through the development of a “strategic and comprehensive partnership” (which comes with up to €5 billion in macro-financial assistance from Brussels) as well as support for the Egyptian armed forces. EU heads of state, foreign ministers and envoys should consistently point out to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Egypt, that a prolonged conflict does not serve their interests. It should press the UAE and Egypt, in particular, to help bring the belligerents to the table. Annette Weber, the EU special representative for the Horn of Africa, who has engaged in extensive shuttle diplomacy with regional leaders and international stakeholders, should continue those efforts with the support of member states.

To coordinate its approach better, the EU should ... consider creating a dedicated contact group for Sudan.

To coordinate its approach better, the EU should also consider creating a dedicated contact group for Sudan, possibly helmed by foreign ministers from key member states. Such a group would allow member states with a major diplomatic interest, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and others, to harmonise their policies. 

In addition, the EU should keep sending humanitarian assistance to Sudan and step up its assistance in Chad. The latter should target Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees, as well as host communities, and support projects that reduce intercommunal frictions among these groups. In 2024, Brussels allocated €72 million in humanitarian aid to alleviate the harm caused by the conflict, which was topped up to €147.3 million by year's end. The EU is set to spend at least €90 million in 2025. The bloc should also encourage member states to maintain humanitarian funding commitments made at the April 2024 Paris conference, organised by France, Germany and the EU, totalling €2 billion, more than half from the EU and its member states. To facilitate humanitarian operations, the EU should also push, in concert with other external actors with influence such as Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the U.S., for safe, unimpeded humanitarian access, the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance across front lines and the free movement of humanitarian workers.

Finally, the EU should continue to support efforts, including by the AU, to encourage Sudan’s various political and civil forces to forge a more united front toward ending the war, including potentially hammering out what a post-war unity government could look like. This political dialogue should include women, with a view to bolstering the progress that was made in increasing their participation in public life after Bashir’s ouster, much of which has now been lost. By continuing to provide diplomatic and technical assistance, the EU can boost efforts to find common ground among political groups, community leaders and civil society, which will be essential to build a stable post-war future. The EU should also make clear to mediators that – if it is to endure – any deal to end the war must provide for broad, representative civilian participation in the new administration. 

Asia

Bangladesh: The Dilemmas of a Democratic Transition

Less than six months after a popular uprising ousted long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s interim government has announced fresh elections, to be held between December 2025 and June 2026. Led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the government and its supporters hope the vote will not just restore democracy but also herald a new era in Bangladeshi politics after fifteen years of increasingly autocratic and repressive rule. 

Hasina’s party, the Awami League (AL), which had seized partisan control of much of the state apparatus, has been shunted to the political margins, creating opportunities for constitutional, electoral, administrative and economic reform. But the overwhelming support that the interim government enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of Hasina’s downfall has begun to wane, and Yunus is now facing pressure to deliver concrete results. His government has not only struggled to contain rifts with other political forces, but it is also facing public criticism over its day-to-day management. The challenges are likely to grow in the coming year, as opposition parties, student leaders, Islamist groups and other key players jockey for electoral advantage. Bangladesh’s strained relations with its giant neighbour India, which staunchly backed Hasina’s regime until the very end, present a further hurdle to maintaining stability. Meanwhile, the interim government is also saddled with the responsibility of managing over a million Rohingya refugees, as well as dealing with instability along the border with war-torn Myanmar. 

Despite these challenges, Bangladesh presents the EU with a rare opportunity to support a democratic transition and improve its standing with an important trade partner in a region of critical geopolitical importance. 

To support Bangladesh, the EU and its member states should:

  • Organise high-level visits and continue to emphasise support for the interim government’s reforms in order to burnish the Yunus administration’s public image domestically and weaken forces seeking to undermine its agenda. The EU should also continue to pursue negotiations over a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

  • Provide technical and financial support for the interim government’s political, administrative and economic reforms. The EU is well placed to assist in a range of areas, including strengthening key institutions, improving governance and protecting human rights. It should also send an electoral observer mission to monitor the polls.

  • Contribute to stabilising the national economy by using Europe’s influence at international financial institutions to mobilise additional fiscal support for Bangladesh; helping create a more attractive environment for foreign investment, a priority for the interim government; supporting efforts to diversify the economy away from garment manufacturing; assisting with the recovery of assets linked to corrupt businesspeople and officials; and continuing negotiations with Dhaka on extending Bangladesh’s preferential access to the European market beyond 2029. 

  • Working to limit tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi, including by quietly encouraging India, including through high-level engagements the EU is planning in 2025, to be more supportive of reform in Bangladesh. The EU should use its influence with both sides to overcome mistrust and shift relations onto a better footing. 

  • Maintain funding for the Rohingya humanitarian response in Bangladesh to help both refugees and host communities, while providing support for a planned UN high-level conference on the Rohingya crisis that Dhaka has lobbied for and encouraging the interim government to engage the Arakan Army across the Myanmar border.

Anti-government protestors celebrate in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 5, 2024, after army chief Waker-Uz-Zaman declared that he would be ″taking full responsibility’’ following Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. Zabed Hasnain Chowdhury / NurPhoto via AFP

A Window for Reform

In early August, Prime Minister Hasina fled Bangladesh as thousands of protesters closed in on her residence. The protests had started barely a month earlier, when public university students launched a movement calling for changes to the system of state job quotas. Hasina’s brutal attempts to crush the unrest backfired. Amid simmering discontent over her rule, the demonstrations morphed into a mass movement that forced her from office. Her downfall marked a historic moment for Bangladesh, but one laced with uncertainty, given the country’s factious and often violent political landscape. Eventually, a deal involving the army, student leaders and main political parties saw Yunus installed as “chief adviser” of an interim government comprising students and civil society figures, as well as former bureaucrats and generals. 

The respect that Yunus commands both at home and abroad has been crucial in establishing the interim government’s legitimacy, mobilising support for ambitious political reforms and maintaining consensus among key political players. But while the euphoria that accompanied Hasina’s ouster translated into widespread support at the outset of Yunus’s administration, the honeymoon is now over. Popular pressure has mounted on the government to start delivering not just on the promised reforms, but also on improvements to day-to-day governance.

A burning issue has been the scheduling of fresh national elections. By December, the interim administration was under growing pressure from the country’s main opposition force, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), to announce a date for polls that would return Bangladesh to the parliamentary democracy its constitution provides for. On 16 December, Yunus said the vote would take place between December 2025 and June 2026, meaning that his administration would stay in office less than two years. The announcement has mostly, although not entirely, silenced the critics. But the prospect of polling day, even if it is distant, has also stirred up competition among the BNP, other political parties (such as the Islamist force Jamaat-e-Islami) and student leaders, who have now confirmed their plans to form a new political party. 

Many of the details of the electoral process and the post-election period remain uncertain.

Beyond the date, many of the details of the electoral process and the post-election period remain uncertain. As part of an ambitious reform agenda, Yunus has formed more than a dozen commissions, including one tasked with overhauling the constitution and another focused on remaking the electoral system. Four of these commissions reported back to the interim government in mid-January, proposing sweeping political reforms. Yunus himself leads another commission that will then negotiate with prominent political and social forces, including political parties, over which of the proposed reforms to push through and which to discard or leave to future governments. Preserving consensus among the various political forces at play will be crucial for this process to succeed.

With Hasina’s AL banished to the political fringes, with its leaders in exile and its activists at home largely dormant, the BNP has become the country’s largest political force. It is widely seen as the government in waiting. Many in Bangladesh are unnerved by this prospect, however. When in power in the past – particularly in the early 2000s – the BNP has often exhibited similar autocratic tendencies to Hasina’s AL – a major concern for the interim government and its supporters, given that its reforms aim to prevent the country from slipping back into authoritarian rule. The public appetite for deep political reform nevertheless gives Yunus a degree of leverage. The BNP will want to avoid looking like a spoiler in the run-up to elections.

Beyond political jostling, the interim government is grappling with other pressing challenges. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction with Hasina’s government was its mismanagement of the economy, including rampant corruption and her cronies’ looting of the financial sector, which has left at least ten banks “technically bankrupt”, according to a government inquiry. When Yunus entered office, foreign exchange reserves were dwindling, and food price inflation stood at almost 15 per cent. His actions, including installing competent officials at key institutions and ministries to improve policymaking and restore confidence, appear to have averted an economic crisis. But the economy has still taken a hit, due to political unrest and the uncertainty it has sown for businesses and investors. Bangladeshis continue to suffer from stubbornly high inflation, particularly in the cost of food, while foreign exchange shortages have contributed to widespread power cuts. The International Monetary Fund expects growth to rebound sharply and inflation to halve in the next fiscal year, but a buoyant economy will require reforms to encourage local and foreign investment, tackle corruption and red tape, and diversify into new sectors. Conversely, failure to create enough jobs for Bangladesh’s young, increasingly well-educated population risks sowing the seeds of future political unrest.

Disinformation and Neighbourhood Tensions

Yunus’s “new Bangladesh” has also faced allegations of rising violence against religious minorities – particularly Hindus, who make up around 8 per cent of the population – and accusations of turning a blind eye to, if not encouraging, Islamist forces’ growing influence in the wake of Hasina’s ouster. Most of these recriminations have come from AL supporters and India, which has long backed the AL and was Hasina’s staunchest supporter, but they have also gained traction in the U.S. and Europe, where critics have claimed that Bangladesh risks “descending into turmoil akin to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan”. 

Attacks on Hindus have indeed taken place, particularly in the first few days after Hasina fled, when the police had largely abandoned their posts. But most victims seem to have been targeted on account of their affiliation with the former regime, rather than their religious identity, and the scale of the phenomenon has been hugely inflated by the interim government’s opponents. A respected human rights group documented 127 incidents of violence against Hindus in 2024 – a number sharply higher than the previous year, but fewer than that recorded in 2021. Similarly, allegations that Islamist forces were behind the uprising and now exert significant influence over the government are misleading; they seem designed to weaken international support for Dhaka by playing on Islamophobia. Much of the responsibility for these attack lines lies with media outlets and politicians in India, as well as powerful Hindu nationalist diaspora groups, who even managed to convince Donald Trump to mention the issue in a social media post in the final week of the U.S. presidential campaign. 

The origin and tenor of these accusations underscore the interim government’s difficulties in handling the relationship with India. New Delhi’s support for the ousted government made it deeply unpopular among Bangladeshis, and anti-Indian sentiment has grown since the uprising due to the perception that India is trying to undermine Yunus’s government and engineer the AL’s return. Indian authorities have not only sheltered Hasina in exile, but also made it difficult for Bangladeshis to get visas and, as noted above, regularly criticised Dhaka over minority and religious rights. The Adani group – one of India’s largest conglomerates, whose founder is closely associated with Prime Minister Narendra Modi – has also scaled back electricity exports to Bangladesh over unpaid debts that accumulated mainly under Hasina, worsening power shortages. A dispute over border fencing has only added to tensions.

Dhaka can hardly afford to alienate the regional superpower, which remains a crucial political and economic partner. But it also cannot ignore domestic public opinion – and, on occasion, it has taken actions evincing displeasure with New Delhi’s behaviour. In September, for example, it temporarily halted exports of a popular variety of fish ahead of a Hindu festival, then cancelled a project that would have improved internet connectivity in India’s north east. It has also taken up the issue of Indian border guards killing Bangladeshis trying to cross illegally into India – a recurrent phenomenon that Hasina’s government had largely ignored. 

Dhaka’s policies ... have contributed to a dependency on foreign aid and seem ill suited to an environment of declining international funding for the Rohingya crisis.

Bangladesh’s other international border, with Myanmar, is even more restive. Violence in Myanmar has increased exponentially since the February 2021 military coup that saw popular leader Aung San Suu Kyi imprisoned. Western Myanmar has been in violent flux for several years, with the Arakan Army – an ethnic armed group mainly representing the Buddhist Rakhine people – gradually expelling the military regime from almost all of Rakhine State. After taking over Maungdaw township in December, the group now controls the entire border with Bangladesh, and all the areas from which some 750,000 Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh in 2016-2017. While Dhaka insists that repatriation of the million-plus refugees it hosts go ahead, it remains reluctant to talk directly to the Arakan Army, on the grounds that it is a non-state group. Meanwhile, Dhaka’s policies – including a prohibition on refugees working – have contributed to a dependency on foreign aid and seem ill suited to an environment of declining international funding for the Rohingya crisis.

Within Rakhine State, intercommunal frictions have also worsened because of the conflict. In 2024, Rohingya armed groups, which had been clashing with one another for control of the refugee camps in southern Bangladesh, aligned themselves with Myanmar’s military regime to fight the Arakan Army. Combined, they forcibly recruited as many as 5,000 refugees, mainly for the military’s side; some were also pressed into military service within Rakhine State or lured with promises of money and citizenship. Now that the military has been entirely expelled from northern Rakhine State, Rohingya armed groups are allegedly regrouping to wage an insurgency against the Arakan Army. An estimated 70,000 Rohingya refugees have already fled into Bangladesh over the last year, and more could join them if there is further violence in Rakhine. Dhaka, meanwhile, has successfully lobbied the UN to hold a high-level conference on the Rohingya later in 2025 aimed at developing a “a comprehensive, innovative, concrete and time-bound plan for the sustainable resolution of the crisis”. For the conference to make any progress, however, the interim government will need to overcome its hesitation and include the Arakan Army in talks.

What the EU Should Do

In the wake of Hasina’s fall from power, Bangladesh has a rare opportunity to reshape its national political system and render it more inclusive and accountable. International backing – rhetorical, technical and financial – will be vital to the success of these reforms, and the EU should do what it can to support this process. A good start would be expressions of public support for the Yunus administration’s reform agenda, including in the form of high-level visits both in Bangladesh and Europe. The EU should continue discussions on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which it suspended at the height of the violence in July but resumed in November. Such support will be important in the coming months as the interim government faces increasing pressure to deliver results and its opponents attempt to derail the reform agenda or push for early elections. 

The EU has already backed a number of short-term projects to prevent political instability resulting from the protest movement and the downfall of Hasina’s government, including support for civil society. Brussels should also be ready to offer support for reforms geared toward strengthening the independence of institutions such as the Election Commission and Anti-Corruption Commission, as well as efforts to bolster human rights through the amendment of repressive laws like the Cyber Security Act. As Brussels and European capitals offer their support, they should coordinate among themselves in a “Team Europe” approach – namely, a joint effort by the EU and member states to work better together and pool resources and expertise – as well as with other donors to avoid overlap and refrain from stretching the government’s limited human and administrative resources.

The EU also has an important role to play in strengthening rights for marginalised groups, particularly religious and ethnic minorities, and it should encourage Yunus’s government to continue taking a strong stand against those seeking to foment communal violence. It should also ensure that political and economic opportunities for women – who played a prominent role during the July-August protests – continue to improve. In this respect, it is likely to find a willing partner in the Yunus administration, which has made inclusivity a pillar of its reform agenda and incorporated several women and minority leaders into its own ranks. It should, however, tread carefully in how it advocates for such improvements, particularly when it comes to LGBTQI rights. While many in the interim government are broadly supportive of addressing discrimination against the LGBTQI community, there are limits to what they can say and do publicly without provoking backlash from conservative segments of society. 

Backing the interim government’s reforms will help restore the EU’s image in Bangladesh, where it is perceived – not entirely unfairly – as having been overly supportive of the former government and focused mainly on its own economic interests. European diplomats, some of whom publicly aligned with the AL regime, should broaden their engagement with the country’s array of political forces, including student leaders and Islamist groups, which are now an inescapable part of the Bangladeshi political landscape. Aside from sending a clear message that they have moved on from the Hasina years, European capitals would gain greater insight into Bangladeshi politics, while enabling diplomats to encourage these political forces to keep supporting reforms as well as avoid inflammatory actions in the run-up to elections. After three flawed national elections, holding free, fair and peaceful polls will be paramount for restoring the Bangladeshi people’s faith in electoral politics. Given the EU’s expertise in this area, Brussels should send an observer mission to monitor the election.

As Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, the EU can also help support the recovery and development of the national economy. The interim government has already made progress in improving economic management, particularly in the banking sector. Even so, it could still face economic headwinds, particularly given its low foreign exchange reserves and dependence on garment exports (which make up more than 80 per cent of the country’s total exports). The EU can help in several ways. First, it should use its influence at international financial institutions to mobilise additional support for the interim government. Secondly, it can improve prospects for long-term economic growth in Bangladesh by helping create a more appealing environment for foreign investment – for example by supporting reforms to customs systems and legal frameworks as well as efforts to diversify the economy away from garment manufacturing. The most recent business initiative supported by the EU, the launch of a local EuroCham, could lay the groundwork for further projects under the EU’s Global Gateway umbrella, an initiative to invest in infrastructure worldwide. Thirdly, it can boost Bangladesh’s remittances by expanding pathways for safe and legal migration to European countries, such as through the Talent Partnership Project. Finally, EU member states should actively help the Bangladeshi government recover the numerous assets acquired illegally by those who were part of or close to the Hasina regime. Many of these assets are in Europe. 

Improving the relationship between Bangladesh and India should ... be a priority for the EU.

Improving the relationship between Bangladesh and India should also be a priority for the EU. European diplomats should emphasise to New Delhi that remaining wedded to the AL is no longer a viable strategy, adding that its perceived failure to support the interim government is only stoking anti-India sentiment within the country and is detrimental to its long-term interests. In parallel, it should encourage Dhaka not to fan anti-Indian sentiment and to take further steps to address legitimate Indian concerns, such as by offering assurances that it will meet all its legal obligations related to bilateral projects initiated under Hasina.

Finally, the EU and its member states should strive to maintain their support for the humanitarian response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. International funding has been declining in recent years, with the UN’s 2024 response plan just 56 per cent funded. While the EU remains one of the largest donors, some European countries have cut back assistance. The trend risks accelerating, given the strong probability that the Trump administration will slash the U.S. aid budget, making European funding all the more important. Similarly, the U.S. is expected to reduce the number of refugees it accepts for resettlement every year; the EU’s member states should strive to resettle more Rohingya. 

That said, even in the best-case scenario the vast majority of Rohingya refugees will remain in the sprawling camps that host them in southern Bangladesh for the foreseeable future – and, as mentioned earlier, more could cross over from Myanmar as conflict rages across the border. The EU should work with Dhaka to adopt policies that foster refugee self-reliance and minimise the costs of delivering vital services, support Bangladesh’s efforts to convene a high-level Rohingya conference later in 2025 and encourage Dhaka to step up its engagement with the Arakan Army, which is now an inescapable interlocutor for any repatriation plans. 

Addressing the Challenges of an Emboldened North Korea

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un enters 2025 with a blooming partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin and wind in his sails. Even before the two countries signed a treaty in June 2024, they had been cooperating, with Kim funnelling arms to Russia and Putin sending much-needed oil to North Korea. This trend accelerated after signing of the treaty, which contains a mutual defence clause. In October 2024, more than 10,000 North Korean soldiers began travelling to fight alongside Russians in the Kursk region that abuts the Russia-Ukraine border. Putin is paying in cash and commodities for their services, as well as giving North Korea’s ground forces – which have not seen combat since 1953 – battlefield experience. He may also be contributing to its military development programs.

Broader peninsular and international political trends also seem to be moving in Kim’s favour. China, which has on occasion exercised a moderating influence on North Korea, does not appear keen to play the role now – even if it is less than happy about Russia’s new schemes with Pyongyang. South Korea has been grappling with political instability after President Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed attempt to declare martial law in December 2024. A contested impeachment process and the resulting uncertainty about Yoon’s tenure have complicated South Korea’s foreign policy. In particular, political tumult in Seoul could disrupt trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, which might have the effect of relieving pressure on North Korea. The U.S. is a wild card: Donald Trump is now back in the White House, and he has said he would like to re-engage with Kim. That said, there is no clear indication what his approach to the Korean peninsula will be. 

As he explores his options, Trump will find peninsular dynamics changed from when he was last in office. Gone is any spirit of rapprochement between North and South. In two speeches a little over a year ago, Kim dropped North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea, instead declaring Seoul to be Pyongyang’s principal foe. The end of the year saw the regime pushing ahead with a flurry of missile tests in violation of sanctions, around the same time as North Korean troops set foot on the borders of Ukraine. In this environment, there is heightened potential for miscalculations and misunderstandings. Given Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities, these risks are of global interest, including in Europe. But they also take on new significance for the EU and member states, given the growing interconnectedness of the Korean peninsula and European conflict theatres.

To promote peace and security on the Korean peninsula and Ukraine while laying the foundations for future dialogue, the EU should: 

  • Both work with partners to reset Pyongyang’s calculations about supporting Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine; and be prepared to support potential U.S. diplomacy with North Korea if it could lower risks of conflict on the peninsula and sufficiently protect other European interests;

  • Press for Beijing to do more to restrain North Korea by quietly leveraging Chinese concerns about Russian military cooperation with North Korea;

  • Intensify EU support for trilateral coordination among Japan, the U.S. and South Korea, as well as the South Korea-led Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, which is in the process of replacing the UN Panel of Experts vetoed by Russia in the spring of 2024;

  • Deploy EU and member states’ expertise in cybersecurity to support South Korea and other states that are battling North Korean cyberwarfare in order to reduce the financial and intelligence gains Pyongyang reaps from large-scale online crime.

A portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen near national flags of North Korea and Russia in Pyongyang on June 20, 2024, displayed for Putin’s summit with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. KIM Won Jin / AFP

North Korea and the Ukraine War

The North Korean troop deployment on the Ukraine war front is just one aspect of a bilateral relationship that has evolved into a military alliance. Although events on the Russian battlefield are murkier to outside observers than those in Ukraine, North Korean soldiers are actively participating in combat alongside Russian forces – and dying in significant numbers. South Korea estimates that at least 300 had died by mid-January, with 2,700 more wounded. They are being captured, too: in early January, Kyiv released videos of North Korean prisoners of war. Moreover, since late 2023 North Korea has shipped tens of thousands of containers of munitions and weaponry to Russia, including heavy artillery shells and KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles. President Putin, in turn, promised that Russia would aid North Korea’s satellite launch program, a quid pro quo that the U.S. said in January could include some of Moscow’s more advanced satellite technology. If Russian support extends to providing North Korea with launch tools as well as satellite payloads, Moscow would be giving Pyongyang assistance in developing its long-range ballistic missiles – a move that would be in clear violation of UN sanctions.

Nonetheless, Russia’s diplomatic protection via its veto on the UN Security Council – along with China’s – means there is now almost no chance of meaningful additional sanctions being imposed on Pyongyang, almost irrespective of what the regime does. The one exception might be a return to nuclear testing, which would likely trigger a strong Chinese reaction and could lead to pressure from Beijing on Moscow to pass new measures in the Security Council, but Pyongyang seems not to be planning to pursue that option, despite evidence that it has restored its nuclear test site in the far north east of the country after demolishing tunnels there in 2018. Thanks to Russia’s March 2024 veto of the renewal of a UN Panel of Experts charged with checking on enforcement of existing sanctions, there is less reason for other Security Council members, especially China, to be concerned about the reputational impact of sanctions being violated, either by the state itself or private actors operating from other territories. 

The protection Russia offers at the UN is just one of the many benefits North Korea is reaping from Putin’s support.

The protection Russia offers at the UN is just one of the many benefits North Korea is reaping from Putin’s support. Moscow’s backing bolsters the regime’s legitimacy, especially domestically, where the visit of any major world leader lends a veneer of prestige to the Kim family dictatorship, as well as sowing hope among North Koreans for better economic times. The Russian alliance has brought Pyongyang a financial payoff as well. Each North Korean soldier serving in Kursk is presumed to be earning an estimated $2,000 monthly, a substantial portion of which is very likely funnelled directly to the North Korean government. In addition, Russia is believed to have provided the regime with refined petroleum products in excess of the 500,000 barrel per year cap imposed by the UN Security Council in 2017, at the peak of North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing cycle. Together, these revenue streams and hydrocarbon shipments seem to be helping the country start to recover from the COVID-19 period, when the regime essentially shut down the country’s borders and trade came almost to a standstill.

Pyongyang, in short, seems to be enjoying favourable geopolitical currents. For the time being, it is less economically dependent on the Chinese government, whose influence over the country’s politics and dominance in its international trade have long made the Kim regime uncomfortable. Trade with Russia also gives North Korea an economic supplement to cybercrime, which has emerged as a low-risk, high-earning source of hard currency for the regime over recent years. At the same time, there is no denying that North Korea is risking a lot by deploying troops to Russia. Families will be angry at losing their children in a foreign war. The conscripts will gain exposure to foreign ideas that may call into question the system they live within; those who survive could bring their newfound knowledge back to North Korea. Prisoners in Ukrainian custody are already being interrogated with the assistance of South Korean officials, who have also examined North Korean weapons used on the battlefield. Kim’s gamble, however, is that the benefits outweigh the costs.

The EU and its member states, for their part, view the presence of North Korean troops in Russia as an alarming development and a major escalation in a war that dominates European security concerns. Perceptions that Russia, Iran, North Korea and China are working together in domains that threaten European security have reinforced their alarm. For the high representative of the EU, Kaja Kallas, the strategic relationship with the Indo-Pacific should be geared to how it can best serve the EU’s long-term security and defence interests, first and foremost by ensuring that it helps Europe resist Russian aggression. Countering North Korean malign activities fits with that agenda. 

A Complicating Factor: South Korea’s Political Crisis

Just as Russia and North Korea forged a partnership on the battlefield, South Korean politics plunged into chaos. On 3 December 2024, President Yoon declared martial law. To halt efforts by lawmakers seeking to reverse his declaration, he dispatched the army to block their access to parliament. This move failed, and Yoon’s initiative lasted less than six hours, but it triggered uncertainty that is set to linger deep into 2025 and could affect stability on the peninsula more widely. The opposition-led legislature impeached Yoon on the second attempt, and then also impeached the acting president, Han Duck-soo, leaving the finance minister, Choi Sang-mok, in charge. The Constitutional Court is still deliberating about whether the impeachment was constitutional, but a ruling may arrive in the coming weeks, which should be followed by an election within 60 days if the verdict goes against Yoon. In the meantime, Yoon, who is in custody, appears intent on resisting at every turn.

South Korea’s political crisis is a domestic affair, and its democratic institutions have demonstrated resilience. But the turmoil brings with it risks. The combination of South Korea’s political turbulence and North Korea’s military and economic advances could spur Pyongyang to become more aggressive on the peninsula in 2025. Its 2024 policy pivot on reunification is hardly reassuring. By claiming to have forever abandoned the notion of peaceful unification, Kim set the two Koreas onto a path to becoming implacable enemies. So far, Pyongyang has followed up its policy shift with merely symbolic actions, such as dropping balloons filled with rubbish – and, more recently, propaganda leaflets critical of Yoon – on areas north of Seoul. But it could be tempted to take more provocative actions, with some military strategists fearing that North Korea could try to occupy a South Korean island in the contested waters of the West Sea, and then leverage its nuclear capabilities to deter efforts to retake it.

Yoon’s actions are ... bound to prompt fresh questions ... about South Korea’s reliability as a partner in military and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.

At the same time, a politically volatile Seoul faces likely challenges to its ties to Washington. Trump’s demand that South Korea pay a great deal more for stationing U.S. troops on its border with North Korea during his first term has fuelled the fear that he will once again decide that Seoul should cough up for its defence. Yoon’s actions are also bound to prompt fresh questions in Washington, and indeed in Tokyo, about South Korea’s reliability as a partner in military and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, especially since Yoon was the main architect of the 2022 Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. If Yoon were replaced by a candidate of the opposition Democratic Party, which is sceptical of improved relations with Japan, cooperation could prove difficult or impossible to sustain at its current high levels.

With Trump back in the White House, some in Seoul also fear a return to “Korea passing”, where the U.S. engages North Korea directly and without South Korean participation, mediation or input – potentially to South Korea’s detriment. Following Trump’s failed attempt at striking a deal with Kim during his first term, Seoul rightly frets that it is only a matter of time before U.S.-North Korean diplomatic forays resume. Unfolding developments in other parts of the world could even create unconventional opportunities for engagement with Kim early in Trump’s term. U.S. attempts at influencing the conflict in Ukraine, for example, could quite plausibly lead to conversations between Washington and Pyongyang. A cessation of hostilities would require arrangements for the repatriation of North Korean troops now stationed in Kursk, which could be a reason for Trump to re-establish communication with Kim.

What the EU Can Do

The EU should leverage its friendships and alliances to reset Pyongyang’s calculations about the merits of close alignment with Russia, involvement in the Russo-Ukraine war and other acts of hostility. Among the options at its disposal, Brussels should sound out Chinese misgivings about Russian military cooperation with North Korea and its possible effects on China’s own security, seeking in turn to communicate its own concerns about the effects on both European stability and the Korean peninsula of Pyongyang’s involvement in the war, with a view to the difficult task of persuading Beijing to restrain its neighbour.

But even as it seeks to strengthen diplomatic counterweights to North Korea, Europe should not dismiss the benefits of diplomacy with Pyongyang under the right circumstances. For example, should the Trump administration make fresh overtures toward Kim, as Trump said he would on 23 January, and if these are reciprocated by Pyongyang, then the EU and member states should stand ready to be supportive. They might also explore whether a more general thaw between North Korea and the West is feasible, and if so, how it could be managed to reduce threats to European security. 

To be sure, anger within European states and institutions over North Korea’s participation in the Ukraine war cannot be underestimated. Furthermore, European diplomats may sense that an overly hasty reopening of dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea could be detrimental to the interests of the EU and its member states, above all if these conversations begin while Pyongyang’s troops continue to wage war on behalf of Russia. But Brussels’ commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula and elsewhere should also guide its posture. Overall, the EU should stand ready to cautiously welcome any effort that could curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and help reduce the danger of conflict arising from miscalculations or misunderstandings between Pyongyang and the West, while also pursuing an end to the North Korean military deployment in the Ukraine war. 

The EU should seek ways to use the carrots and sticks at its disposal to apply targeted pressure on Pyongyang.

In the meantime, the EU should seek ways to use the carrots and sticks at its disposal to apply targeted pressure on Pyongyang. Doubling down on efforts to curtail North Korean sanctions evasion is one priority. With the Japan-South Korea rapprochement likely to come under a degree of pressure in Seoul, especially if a candidate from the left comes to power in elections, the EU should work to buttress the bilateral relationship and nurture the gains made since 2022. The EU should consider strengthening its support for the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, which is being founded by the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and New Zealand in addition to South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The Team is designed to replace the UN Panel of Experts that was vetoed by Russia in 2024, but finds itself under a degree of threat due to the flux in South Korean politics. 

Furthermore, Brussels should intensify its collaboration with Seoul with a view to clamping down on burgeoning North Korean cybercrime, as foreseen in the Security and Defence Partnership agreement signed by the two in November 2024. The EU, along with member states with capabilities in this field, such as the Netherlands, should mobilise their expertise to support South Korea – and the many other countries that have been targets of North Korean hackers – to protect against cyber threats and reduce the revenue and intelligence flows Pyongyang derives from it.

Europe and Central Asia

Securing Moldova’s Future as the Gas Runs Low

Moldova faces a difficult start to 2025, with its stability and prospects for EU integration hanging in the balance. The country of 2.5 million residents is struggling to manage an energy crisis that is crippling its breakaway region of Transnistria, a Russia-backed enclave that has been de facto self-governing and hosting Russian military forces since turmoil and war in the early 1990s. With gas shortages and soaring energy prices nationwide, Moldova is bracing for forthcoming parliamentary elections, which government officials in the capital Chisinau expect Russia will try to influence in order to set back their efforts to join the EU. Meanwhile, Moldova is also waiting to see what moves the U.S. will make in attempting to reach a peace deal in neighbouring Ukraine; how the war there ends will have profound implications for its security. 

As Chisinau deals with these challenges, support from the EU and member states will be of paramount importance. Having granted Moldova candidacy status in 2022, the EU provides the country with significant support for security and energy independence, as well as help with accession-related reforms. But more assistance may be required to help Chisinau meet the old and new threats with which it is grappling.

The EU and its member states should:

  • Send additional financial aid to help Moldova withstand the energy crisis, including by mitigating the humanitarian crisis in Transnistria.
  • Make long-term investments in infrastructure, such as power grids connecting Western Europe with south-eastern Europe to boost regional electricity supply.

  • Help Chisinau counter disinformation in advance of the parliamentary elections and break up illicit financing schemes, including those that may be linked to Russia-affiliated political parties and groups. 

  • If they are successful in cooperating to address the energy crisis, encourage Chisinau and Tiraspol to pursue further dialogue, with Brussels playing the role of mediator. 

  • Insist on respect for Moldovan security and interests as part of the EU position in any discussions about peace for Ukraine. 

A man holds a lantern at the window of his apartment at night during a programmed power shortage in Varnita on January 17, 2025. The energy crisis spread in Moldova, which used to receive electricity fuelled by Russian gas. Daniel MIHAILESCU / AFP

Grappling with the Energy Crisis

The energy crisis began on 1 January when Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, suspended supplies to Moldova, citing the latter’s refusal to settle what Gazprom said was a $709 million debt for previous deliveries. Chisinau disputes the amount, saying it owes at most $8.6 million and pointing to an international audit in support of its position. But the debt dispute is longstanding. More immediately, on 31 December 2024, the five-year contract between Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz for transporting gas through Ukraine to other European countries, including Moldova, expired. Kyiv had been saying it would not renew the deal since soon after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Moldova’s own deal with Gazprom does not run out until 30 September 2026, but to fulfil it, Moscow and Chisinau would have to agree on a new supply route.

The crisis came as no surprise. Throughout 2024, aware that the Russo-Ukrainian contract was approaching its end, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova explored options for keeping the gas flowing. Negotiators considered whether an Azerbaijani or Slovak firm could collect the gas at the Ukraine-Russia border and send it on to the Moldovan and other markets. But Ukraine insisted that it would not allow Russian gas to transit its territory so long as Moscow’s aggression continued. Russia, in turn, rejected a joint proposal from Moldova and Ukraine that Russia deliver gas to Moldova via the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which passes from Russia under the Black Sea to Türkiye and, from there, to south-eastern Europe, demanding that Moldova first pay what Gazprom says it is owed.Eventually, Kyiv also soured on the Trans-Balkan pipeline idea, pressing for a solution that did not involve Russian gas and offering to send coal to Transnistria in exchange for electricity supplies to Ukraine. 

Moldovan officials view the Russian decision to stop gas supplies as a political ploy more than a commercial move.

Moldovan officials view the Russian decision to stop gas supplies as a political ploy more than a commercial move. Moscow has previously used gas flows as a cudgel. In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom reduced its gas supplies to Moldova by 30 per cent. This time around, Chisinau believes Moscow’s objective is to damage Moldova’s ruling party, which supports EU integration, in the run-up to parliamentary elections later in 2025. A poor showing for the party might in turn set back Moldova’s EU integration prospects.

Whatever the motive, the consequences have been dire. Transnistria is especially hard hit. Until the cutoff, the Russian gas was piped to Transnistria, which did not pay for it, but used it to generate inexpensive electricity, some of which Tiraspol sold to the rest of Moldova (which was getting as much as 80 per cent of its power this way). Without Russian gas, the region’s de facto authorities are using coal to generate power, with reserves expected to run out soon after the end of January. To stretch its stores of coal and gas, Tiraspol has decreed widespread blackouts and suspended the supply of electricity for heating buildings and water. In the middle of winter, 1,500 apartment blocks now lack heat or hot water; 72,000 households are without gas; and numerous schools and kindergartens have no heat. Since the year began, four people have died from сarbon monoxide poisoning as they tried to stay warm. With the exception of food processing, Transnistrian industries have stopped work, and many among the 366,000-person population may begin to leave the enclave. European diplomats on the ground agree that, with its economy paralysed, the de facto government risks running out of funds to pay salaries and pensions.

The shutdown has affected Transnistria more than the rest of Moldova. Most of the country has not relied on direct shipments of Russian gas since the end of 2022. But Moldovans’ utility bills have gone up sharply, as the country is now buying electricity from Romania, at a 65-75 per cent higher cost to consumers. Moreover, because there are limits to how much electricity Moldova can purchase from neighbours, over time the crisis could cause outages countrywide. Due to infrastructure limitations, Ukraine and Moldova combined can receive a maximum of 2,100 megawatts (MW) per day from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. Of this amount, Moldova is guaranteed only 315 MW per day, though it can now receive up to 600 MW, provided that other importers, including Ukraine, do not draw more. But even at 600 MW, Moldova risks shortages during periods of peak demand. A further danger is that the Isaccea-Vulcanesti power line, connecting Romania to Moldova, passes through Ukraine and Transnistria, making it vulnerable to Russian attack and Tiraspol’s interference. 

Meanwhile, because the cost of gas has gone up in Europe overall, Chisinau raised gas prices for households by 27.5 per cent as of 1 December. On 16 December, the government declared a 60-day state of emergency to ensure it can rapidly diversify its energy supplies. It also plans to offset the hit to wallets with compensation payments. To help curb the expected surge in inflation, on 10 January the Bank of Moldova raised its refinancing rate from 3.6 per cent to 5.6 per cent per annum. 

Options to Warm Transnistria

Transnistria continues to look to Russia for a way out of its penuries. In January, the region’s de facto president, Vadim Krasnoselsky, travelled to Moscow for talks, returning with a promise of “humanitarian” gas supplies – enough to meet Transnistria’s consumption needs but not enough to generate electricity for sale. Sending such supplies would be a way for Moscow to strengthen bonds with Tiraspol while keeping pressure on Chisinau, which would continue to grapple with high electricity prices. But the Moscow-Tiraspol plan quickly hit a series of snags, as Moscow and Tiraspol struggled to find a way to deliver gas to Transnistria – and to pay for it.

Meanwhile, the EU and Moldova have developed their own support package. Moldovan officials initially offered to help arrange a mix of humanitarian aid and support from Western partners, but suggested that the latter would depend on the withdrawal from the region of 1,500 Russian soldiers (comprising regular troops as well as internationally agreed peacekeepers), who would be replaced by a UN or EU civilian mission. Russia responded by threatening Moldova, warning it not to use the energy crisis to wrest back control of the breakaway region. In late January, Brussels and Chisinau proffered a new, stopgap plan, which Tiraspol has now reportedly accepted. This proposal does not require Russian troop withdrawals and sees the EU providing Moldova with a €30 million emergency assistance package to purchase gas on the open market. The plan will provide all of Moldova with electricity and Transnistria with heat for the first ten days of February. Moldova would also supply Transnistria with 3 million cubic meters of gas on credit to temporarily maintain pressure in its gas system, with Tiraspol agreeing to either pay or compensate with gas later on. The deal will buy time until some other arrangement, likely with a European intermediary providing gas to Transnistria with Russian financial support, can be concluded.

Ideally, cooperation in solving Tiraspol’s energy challenges would create an opening for greater dialogue between Moldova and Transnistria. Both could gain from rapprochement and – aspirational though it may be given where relations are at present – a gradual negotiated path toward eventual reintegration. But there are still enormous obstacles to repairing the rift between them. Tiraspol is pulled by a web of personal and business ties toward Moscow, with political and economic power concentrated in the Sheriff holding company, which shows little interest in democratic reforms that would be required for EU accession.

Legislative Elections

The energy crisis comes as Moldova prepares for legislative elections, due to take place by the autumn of 2025. The polls will be an important test for the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) government, which strongly favours EU integration. They follow the 2024 presidential election, in which the incumbent (Maia Sandu of PAS) secured a second term, as well as a referendum which enshrined the goal of EU accession in the constitution. Both votes were very close, and polling showed that expatriates outside the country overwhelmingly supported Sandu and EU accession while voters within Moldova’s borders appeared polarised over the country’s geopolitical direction.

Russian interference almost surely played a big part in making the 2024 votes so tight. Moscow orchestrated a disinformation campaign, mostly using social media, aimed at undermining support for EU accession. Chisinau also alleges that oligarch Ilan Shor, a former Moldovan MP convicted of bank fraud and now living in Russia, where he has received citizenship, paid for “no” votes in the referendum and ballots cast against Sandu. (Shor denies the accusation of vote buying.) An investigation is still under way, but Moldovan police estimate that at least 140,000 people, or some 10 per cent of those who cast their ballots inside the country, may have received payment for their votes through this scheme, with roughly $39 million deposited in their accounts. 

Be that as it may, Moldova’s voters are no monolith. Their backers see in EU accession and the Sandu government the promise of prosperity and transparent democracy. Opponents are frustrated by the rising cost of living, as well as by the fact that moves toward EU integration to date have had little impact on their well-being, leaving them vulnerable to disinformation campaigns. 

At present, PAS holds 62 of 101 seats in the unicameral parliament, allowing it to pass legislation without opposition support. While polls indicate that PAS is leading in the forthcoming parliamentary race, its approval ratings have dropped below 50 per cent and may continue to fall if the energy crisis continues, spurring inflation. But Euro-sceptical opposition parties such as the Socialists and Communists have problems of their own. Their leaders are widely perceived to have ties to the Kremlin, which their opponents can use quite effectively to discredit them in the eyes of the public.

The Ukraine Effect

Hanging over everything is the war in Ukraine. How the war ends could have enormous implications for Moldovan security. On one end of the spectrum, the worst case for Chisinau would be that Moscow winds up in physical control of all or most of Ukraine, giving its forces a land corridor to Transnistria and the rest of Moldova. On the opposite end, should Ukraine gain the upper hand (which it does not now have), Moldovan officials may look to Kyiv and its allies to push for a full withdrawal of Russian forces from their country. 

At present, however, neither of these scenarios seems as likely as a fragile peace process in which the Kremlin seeks political sway over Kyiv and additional concessions on Transnistria and Moldova, including reversing the latter’s EU integration process, as part of an overall peace package. The EU would virulently oppose this demand. But the mere prospect of such an outcome could push Tiraspol even further away from Chisinau and toward Moscow. If Moldova’s security is eventually compromised by a deal on Ukraine, the consequences could also reverberate across Europe. Russia would likely seek to expand its influence yet further, over other countries in the region. 

Now, as prospects for peace talks, if not peace, seem stronger than they have been in over two years, EU members, Ukraine and other partners will need to consolidate their positions. If they do not incorporate Moldova’s sovereignty into their approach, it could cost them in the long term.

Safeguarding Moldova’s Future

Perhaps the most important thing that the EU can do to help Moldova get through this difficult time is to provide more assistance. Brussels has already been generous. Since Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has worked to make Moldova more economically independent, secure and resilient to pave the way for EU membership. It has therefore directed substantial resources toward Chisinau – including the deployment of a partnership mission to bolster the country’s security sector and a €1.8 billion economic aid package covering the period 2025-2027. 

But more aid is needed, particularly in helping Moldova maintain its stability ahead of elections, address the repercussions of the energy crisis and relieve corresponding hardship in Transnistria. The EU and member states should consider several mutually reinforcing initiatives that would serve this goal, including:

  • Helping Moldova maintain a steady flow of gas and electricity, if necessary by providing funding support and facilitating access to electricity on the European market, either through the bloc or bilateral channels.

  • Working with Moldova and international financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to find immediate support measures to compensate Moldovan citizens for electricity rate hikes. 

  • For scenarios in which Transnistria for whatever reason remains without energy supplies, preparing to allocate additional assistance to Chisinau to help prevent a humanitarian crisis in Transnistria. The EU can collaborate with other humanitarian actors on the ground, drawing on its experience in supporting Ukrainian refugees in Moldova and Transnistria. Critical needs could include generators, food, medicines and direct cash support for Transnistria’s population.

  • Encouraging Chisinau to further engage Tiraspol and develop (with EU help) a sustainable contingency energy plan for the entire country, including Transnistria, which does not rely on Russian energy supplies and financial assistance.

Secondly, the EU should invest in long-term energy security for Moldova’s neighbourhood in south-eastern Europe. It should help build new power grids connecting Western Europe to the Balkan countries, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Moldova and Ukraine. These grids will boost supply to all these countries, help prevent electricity shortages and reduce prices. The EU should also invest in expanding Moldova’s own power generation capabilities to bolster its long-term energy independence.

Thirdly, the EU should do what it can to help reduce risks of Russian interference ahead of the 2025 parliamentary polls. Prior to the vote, it should provide additional technical support to Moldova on how to prevent illegal financing of political parties, drawing lessons from the 2024 campaign. The EU could build up its partnership mission and increase investments in strategic communications. It could also try more to actively engage Russian speakers with its messages and to reach out beyond the confines of Chisinau to citizens, including in rural areas, who are often left out of the EU integration discussion. 

Fourthly, Brussels should look for openings to mediate between Chisinau and Tiraspol, with the goal of facilitating development of a common economic space to lay the groundwork for reintegration. Even if Tiraspol rejects talks in the near term, keeping the offer on the table gives it an incentive to consider alternatives to dependence on Moscow. 

Fifthly, as the EU and its member states define their positions in advance of possible negotiations to end the Ukraine war, they should engage with Chisinau to ensure that Moldovan security requirements are incorporated in their interactions with Washington, Moscow and Kyiv. These requirements include preventing Russian military access to Transnistria via Ukraine and arguing for Russian troop withdrawal from Transnistria. An eventual agreement to end the war in Ukraine that respects Moldova’s security and self-determination will benefit not just Moldova, but also the region more broadly.

A Way Out of Ukraine’s War and Toward a More Secure Europe

As Russia’s all-out war in Ukraine approaches its fourth year, the conflict continues to cause immeasurable damage in lives lost and property destroyed. This war has not only threatened Ukraine’s future; it has also shaken the foundations of European security. New U.S. President Donald Trump’s promise to put a swift end to the conflict may offer an opening to still the fighting — but it brings risks as well. It could fail, or the Trump administration could seek a peace deal at the expense of Ukrainian and European security. With or without a settlement, Russia will likely continue trying to intimidate current and aspiring EU members as it seeks to project its power. This campaign could well include more of the actions it has carried out in recent years, such as military threats, support for Euro-sceptical parties and acts of sabotage in member states.

EU officials are adamant that regional stability will hinge on Ukraine remaining independent, sovereign and capable of defending itself in the long term. To that end, the EU is set to continue supporting Ukraine in the near term with military and economic aid. But the EU and its member states will also have to engage with the White House if they are to ensure that their own interests are represented in any deal Washington tries to strike with Russia, as well as revamp their institutions so that member states are ready to assume greater defence responsibilities. The EU needs to be prepared for a dangerous future, where its security and that of its members will depend on keeping Russian expansionism in check while also preventing tensions from escalating into further, potentially catastrophic conflict. 

In seeking to strike a careful balance between deterrence and diplomacy as the new European security order takes shape, the EU and its member states can serve regional peace and security in the near term by:

  • Coordinating engagement with Washington and Kyiv to ensure that the EU and its members’ interests, alongside Ukraine’s, are fully protected in any negotiations with Moscow. Brussels will need to send a clear message to Washington that the EU and its member states cannot be obliged to fulfil promises made by others on their behalf. Though the Kremlin may prefer to negotiate with Trump, at least at first, the EU and its member states should also press for wider talks in which they can be appropriately represented. 

  • For purposes of negotiations, clarifying key positions on what the EU can bring to the table to move talks along, eg, the prospect of some sanctions relief (if certain conditions are met) or long-term commitments to support Ukraine’s defence. 

  • Ramping up military, diplomatic and financial support for Ukraine and for Europe’s future defence. In terms of military aid, EU member states should strive to overcome existing obstacles to joint EU military assistance. 

  • Building on recent progress, seeking ways to invest more in their own defence industries in order to boost aid to Kyiv and strengthen their own future capabilities (eg, through defence bonds or other borrowing). 

People clear debris following a rocket attack in Kyiv on January 18, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Tetiana DZHAFAROVA / AFP

The Prospect of Negotiations

Almost three years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war zone presents a grim panorama. Russia, which occupies about a fifth of Ukraine, continues to make slow but meaningful battlefield progress, and Kyiv is struggling to muster and train enough troops to keep the enemy at bay. The Kremlin is counting on a grinding war of attrition to defeat its neighbour. Russian President Vladimir Putin gives every appearance of believing that Western resolve to support Ukraine will eventually crack; for evidence, he can point to Trump’s election to the U.S. presidency. Indeed, the war’s costs have already become campaign issues in elections across Europe. Thousands of Ukrainians leave the country every month. With no clear prospect for a stable peace, many will not return. Because of travel restrictions for military-aged men, Ukraine’s displacement crisis continues to disproportionately affect women and children. Still, Western support for the war has not dried up yet, and Ukraine fights on. 

Diplomacy to end the war had in effect been on hold pending the U.S. election. Now, with a new administration in the White House, talks may be more plausible than they have been for over two years. Ukraine certainly would benefit from a pause, as it struggles with fatigue and the challenge of mustering troops, but Russia, too, is under economic strain and concerned about the risk of escalation. Having promised during his campaign to bring peace to Ukraine, Trump’s efforts to end the war faces tall hurdles. There is no clear evidence that Russia is seeking peace on terms that are remotely acceptable to Ukraine, to EU members or to many in Washington, preferring instead to render Ukraine a vassal state. Kyiv, for its part, wants binding security guarantees from its partners, ensuring that it can resist any future Russian aggression; its allies, however, have thus far been unwilling to offer anything concrete for fear of setting the stage for a very dangerous direct confrontation between Russia and the West. If talks go forward, hostilities on the ground could well continue, and even if a deal is reached, fighting could easily resume if Moscow interprets the settlement as a sign of Western weakness and is not adequately deterred from resuming its invasion. 

Getting to the negotiating table, reaching a deal that can hold and establishing the terms by which Ukraine can enjoy real security and lasting independence all require both Kyiv, Moscow and Ukraine’s backers to be committed to some sort of peace process. Persuading Russia that such a process would be in its interest is certainly possible. Because the Russian economy still struggles in spite of unexpected resilience, and because Moscow has concerns about escalation, the West has leverage. But deploying it effectively will likely fall to Washington, as Putin views Trump as his only real counterpart, while Russia has been dismissive of talks with the EU. 

It will be critical for the EU and member states to ensure that their interests are fully protected and represented in any prospective talks between Trump and Putin.

It will be critical for the EU and member states to ensure that their interests are fully protected and represented in any prospective talks between Trump and Putin. While the first step may be talks between the U.S. and Russian leaders, the EU and member states should press for wider talks to take place where they can be appropriately represented. Any negotiations will have very high stakes for the EU and their member states, given that their protection from future Russian aggression is on the line. If the fighting continues or resumes after a pause, it is not just Ukraine that could lose its sovereign independence to Russia: Moldova, which is on a path to EU accession and has suffered repeated Russian interference since 2022, is at risk as well (see the accompanying Watch List piece). Other EU member states would suffer, too. If Moscow emerges from the conflict believing its adversaries are weak and pliable, it could test this hypothesis through covert and overt actions aimed at countries on the EU’s eastern flank. 

The EU controls a range of carrots and sticks that will be essential to making a deal of real interest to Russia and worthwhile for Ukraine. Banks in EU member states hold more than 200 billion euros in sovereign Russian assets, and EU sanctions have helped stall Russia’s economy. A willingness to lift these economic sanctions while maintaining other, more directly military-related restrictions could provide an important sweetener for Moscow to sign on to a deal. Ukraine’s backers are also crucial to ensuring that any agreement is honoured, including because they will wield the sticks if Russia reneges. In all likelihood, they will carry much of the burden for continuing to arm Ukraine and strengthening its armed forces, as well as following through with any future European security agreements. Alongside Ukraine and likely Moldova, they will also bear the brunt of any future escalation in hostilities. For these reasons, the EU and its members should ensure that Washington understands not only their prospective leverage over Moscow, but also their unwillingness to abide by – or pay the costs of – agreements to which they are not party.

What the EU Can Do

For now, while talks remain hypothetical, the EU should facilitate discussions among its members about what they need from a deal as well as quiet engagement with Kyiv to ensure coordinated positions vis-à-vis Moscow and Washington. When campaigning, Trump promised to end the war within 24 hours. He now gives himself six months – even as Keith Kellogg, his nominee as special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, says he is aiming for 100 days. Washington’s timeline should spur EU member states to clarify their positions and resolve disagreements, which include disputes over European Peace Facility reimbursements for military support and the Ukraine assistance fund. In preparing for talks, EU policymakers should define how they can effectively use the leverage they have over Russia in order to grease the wheels of negotiations. The U.S., for example, may want to offer to ease certain sanctions in exchange for Russian concessions. But Washington only controls its own sanctions policy. Brussels should communicate to Washington the position that any lifting of EU sanctions could proceed only if it does not put Russia in a better position to strengthen its military capacity. Moreover, any deal would have to contain snapback mechanisms that would go into effect if Moscow does not abide by its pledges.

Member states and EU institutions should also hasten to define a strategy to secure Ukraine’s sovereignty and its ability to defend itself in the long term. Security guarantees – whether arising from NATO membership, bilateral or mini-lateral commitments – are unlikely to fly either practically or politically any time soon. Too many alliance heavyweights, including the U.S. and Germany, have expressed concern about the prospect of mutual defence commitments drawing NATO into a potentially cataclysmic direct war with Russia. The same problems also arise with the prospect of NATO member states deploying peacekeepers to the current war zone once fighting ends. France and the UK have publicly discussed this possibility, whose logic is partly that these troops would serve as a tripwire, guaranteeing that if war restarts, the countries that sent forces, and their allies, will immediately be involved. Ukraine’s candidacy for EU membership, which includes a mutual defence commitment, will at some point also require member states to wrestle with the same challenges. 

Against this backdrop, the EU and its member states will likely need to work with Kyiv to develop other means of creating post-conflict stability in Ukraine. Tough as these arrangements may be to forge, a number of ways to bolster Ukraine’s security while minimising the risks of the onset of Europe-wide military hostilities present themselves. These include seeking deals among Russia, Ukraine and European states to ensure that a strong, well-armed Ukrainian military remains an effective line of defence in the face of Russian aggression; and agreeing to mutual restraints that could foster stability while ensuring that both sides can mount effective deterrence.

EU members will ... need to take on more of their own defence burden.

EU members will also need to take on more of their own defence burden. They will need to do so regardless of what happens in Ukraine, and not just because of potential threats from Russia: with U.S. defence commitments to allies likely to wane and with big-power competition on the rise around the world, dangers are multiplying. The EU should strengthen cooperation with NATO and continue to support its members as they boost military spending, ensuring that this money is spent effectively. The EU is exploring ideas such as defence Eurobonds (which would make it possible to borrow money to help pay for enhanced defence capabilities) and allowing for the further use of EU COVID-19 recovery funds to boost the EU’s defence industry. The new EU leadership will produce a white paper on European defence within its first 100 days, outlining ways to enhance military spending. Their focus should not be just the near term but also a strategy for sustainable defence financing over a period of years.

In the meantime, the EU must act more decisively in pursuit of its interests. This charge is not easy for a multilateral consensus-based organisation that faces the prospect of more internal disagreements as elections bring a diverse set of political parties to power. To date, member states have had success operating through coalitions of the willing, in which like-minded countries band together for the common good without waiting for all members to agree, as was the case with the Czech-initiated effort to deliver more ammunition to Ukraine. The EU can help facilitate more such efforts, including ones that support defence industry cooperation with countries outside the EU, including NATO members Türkiye, the UK and Norway, as well as extra-regional partners such as South Korea.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House presents numerous challenges to the EU at a time when Europe is facing both political flux and an uncertain world. But it also creates an opening, and, indeed, an imperative for Brussels to step up. 

Latin America and the Caribbean

Colombia: From “Total Peace” to Local Peace

A wave of violence swept Colombia in the opening days of 2025, raising deep concerns about Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s flagship security policy, known as “total peace”. Until now, Bogotá has deployed a combination of dialogues and ceasefires with an array of armed groups in a bid to reduce persistently high levels of violence, especially in rural areas. The authorities are now involved in peace processes with at least ten groups, but with chequered results so far. Homicide rates stabilised in conflict-affected areas in 2024, but other forms of violence, such as child recruitment and extortion, continued to rise. Rebel and criminal groups, some of them born in the aftermath of the 2016 peace agreement with the guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have continued to enlarge their footprint in parts of the country. 

The start of the year has seen one the few success stories of “total peace” unravel miserably. At the outset of his term, Petro’s government had ushered in a de facto truce between rival armed groups in Catatumbo, a region along the border with Venezuela. Beginning on 16 January, the guerrilla National Liberation Army (ELN) embarked on a coordinated offensive against dissidents of the former FARC known as the Estado Mayor de los Bloques. Petro called off peace talks with the ELN in the following days. But within hours, other battlefronts erupted involving a range of armed groups, including in Colombia’s Amazon and central regions. Alarmingly, many of the armed groups involved in combat are also sitting in peace talks with the government. 

The wave of violence will likely consolidate a pivot in the government’s negotiation policy. First, the government has moved away from traditional peace talks at a national level, such as those with the ELN, that discuss broad issues such as political or economic reform. Instead, the focus is on local dialogues to address the specific concerns of each region. Instead of aiming for comprehensive demobilisation, the government is asking armed groups to dial down violence against civilians. Secondly, Bogotá has taken the crucial decision to ratchet up military pressure on nearly all armed groups in the hope of recovering the state’s leverage over them. Although it seems unlikely that Colombian state forces will be able to contain deteriorating security conditions, let alone defeat the vast majority of these armed groups, the government now understands that without military pressure these outfits have little incentive to hold up their side of any bargain. 

The European Union is accompanying one of these formal dialogue processes, and it has used its good offices to support two others in urban areas. As such, it can help remind Bogotá of the urgency of de-escalating conflict and nudge the new approach forward in a direction that puts the protection of endangered civilians first. 

The EU and its member states can: 

  • Continue to emphasise civilian protection in any agreement with armed or criminal groups.

  • Highlight the urgency of ending child recruitment, while also helping plan and support demobilisation and reintegration programs for young people who are members of gangs that have agreed to truces.

  • Redouble support for the justice sector, with the goal of hindering criminal activity. Technical assistance to the Attorney General’s offices and Ministry of Justice would enable them to carry out more efficient investigations into conflict-related violence and prosecute cases. The EU can build on its past work supporting a specialised unit set up to stem violence against social leaders and reincorporated FARC fighters. 

  • As a guarantor of the 2016 peace agreement, maintain the focus on implementation of that accord, including linking past commitments to new “total peace” efforts to protect social leaders and support rural development at a local level.

  • Ensure the continuity of vital political and financial support to civil society.

A man wearing wings that read in spanish 'Peace' attends a demonstration against violence in the Catatumbo region, in Bogota on January 26, 2025. Pablo VERA / AFP

From a Successful Peace Process to Mutating Armed Groups

The change in tack of “total peace” is a response to major mutations in the nature of conflict in Colombia. In contrast to the 60-year war with the FARC, a guerrilla force that sought to overthrow the Colombian state and the social status quo, today’s half-dozen major armed groups plus a menagerie of smaller criminal franchises tend to avoid clashes with state security forces. Most of the country’s fighting now derives from violent competition among these outfits for control of illicit business such as coca and cocaine production, illegal mining and extortion. Talking to these small, splintered groups has become an “exercise in unlearning [how to make] peace”, a government negotiator said. “Reality obliged us to break with old methods.” 

This pragmatic turn responds to lessons learnt in the past two years, above all the unwanted effects of the government decision to declare ceasefires in early 2023 – a move that security forces say has put them at a major disadvantage and led to a loss of state control in many areas. This new, localised approach may prove a better fit for a fragmented, heavily criminalised conflict. But even if the diagnosis is correct, the new strategy still faces enormous challenges. A micro-level approach to local conflicts is painstakingly slow and may not yield results before Petro leaves office in August 2026. The tide of public opinion, particularly in cities, has turned against “total peace”. The political stakes of failure are also high: decades of experience in Colombia have shown that while military pressure is necessary, force alone is not a solution to non-state armed violence. Negotiations are an essential component of reaching peace. But unless it produces tangible results, negotiation itself could be discredited as a strategy for addressing conflicts in the future. While it is still early days, likely leading contenders in the 2026 presidential race from across the political spectrum have been sharply critical of Petro’s peace strategy.

Colombia’s security dilemmas cannot be pinned solely on the president. Beginning in the years after the 2016 peace accord, and well before Petro took power, armed and criminal groups sought to profit from the FARC’s demobilisation, both by expanding their presence across Colombia and by honing their coercive methods in order to silence, co-opt and control civil society. The state ombudsman has reported that FARC dissident factions – led in many cases by individuals who either refused to sign the 2016 accord or renounced it later, and strengthened since then by a stream of new recruits – have doubled the number of municipalities where they claim a presence since 2019. The Gaitanista Army, also known as the Gulf Clan, now the largest group with as many as 9,000 fighters, has expanded by 62 per cent over the same period, establishing a pre-eminent role in cocaine exports and migrant smuggling through the Darién Gap to Panama. 

Controlling a community enables a group to establish command over territory and all the rents that come with it – whether from legal or illegal activities.

While the presence of armed groups is not new to many rural communities, local people report that the pressure they exert today is worse because dominating civilian populations has become these groups’ core operating method. Controlling a community enables a group to establish command over territory and all the rents that come with it – whether from legal or illegal activities. Civilians accused of being critical of the armed group – or worse, collaborating with a rival outfit – are subject to threats, displacement and assassination. In 2024, the UN said it received reports of 186 human rights defenders assassinated nationwide. In Cauca, a heartland of conflict along the Pacific coast, with at least four armed groups vying for territory, nearly 400 leaders and former combatants have been killed since the peace accord.

The ways in which these groups establish their sway over civilian populations vary. The Gaitanista Army, which is strongest in northern Colombia, funds community development projects, hands out Christmas gifts to children and offers paid jobs in its ranks – not just to fighters but also to accountants and community organisers. Intolerant of outside views, the group has sought either to co-opt existing civil society organisations or simply to start its own, better-funded outfits to meet local needs. In Colombia’s Amazon, on the other hand, FARC dissident factions have frequently imposed themselves upon branches of unarmed civilian guards run by local farmers, which then become the rebels’ gatekeepers and enforcers. Meanwhile, the ELN, the largest remaining insurgency, tightly monitors social leaders in areas it controls, such as in Arauca and the Magdalena Medio region, supporting some and ensuring that others are silenced, expelled or killed. Knowing that any word spoken out of turn could end in a violent penalty, many rural residents say self-censorship is their only protection. 

Child recruitment is a pressing challenge, with boys and girls as young as eleven being tricked to join the front lines. Recruiters are paid a fee to deliver children to groups, in amounts based on the child’s qualities; prices are higher for strong boys or pretty girls, former forced recruits told Crisis Group. Using TikTok, Facebook and WhatsApp, recruiters spin a life of money, guns and motorcycles to boys. In the case of girls, the playbook includes promises of love, empowerment, education and even lures such as all-expenses-paid cosmetic surgery. Girls who face abuse at home are told they will finally be free.

Once in the rank and file, though, children are given only the most basic training – if any – before being sent to the front. “They endure hunger for days”, an Indigenous leader who helps recovered children in Cauca told Crisis Group. “They are hurt in fighting, [and] many return home dead”. Armed groups commonly send child recruits to distant locations, so it is harder for them to escape, the leader explained. Girls at times find that the most effective form of self-protection is allying themselves with a commander, who may nonetheless sexually exploit them and even “rent” them out to other members of the group who are willing to pay. The conditions are so harsh that around Christmastime, community leaders in FARC dissident-controlled areas say they see dozens of cases of children trying to flee to their families. Some of those caught by armed groups have been summarily executed, a common practice for punishing and deterring runaways.

Recalibrating the “Total Peace” Strategy

Faced with this new landscape of violence and its own initial failures, Petro’s government has looked to recalibrate “total peace”. The strategy began by unintentionally encouraging armed groups to extend their reach over local communities, since each organisation wanted to demonstrate the strength of its supposed social base to justify full political negotiations with the state. As noted earlier, government ceasefires, which were intended to scale down levels of violence, in many cases simply gave armed groups breathing space from military pressure and the opportunity to fine-tune their hold on territories and communities. National-level negotiations rooted in wide-ranging discussions of political and social reform, for example with the ELN, progressed at a snail’s pace for two years until being formally cancelled on 17 January. 

Negotiators understand that the vast majority of groups have no interest in laying down arms.

Two years in, the government is working under a new set of assumptions. Negotiators understand that the vast majority of groups have no interest in laying down arms, that the conflict ebbs and flows according to the vagaries of violent grassroots competition, and that approaches rooted in local understandings have the best chance of success. Petro’s strategy now aims to ensure peace efforts have a firm territorial grounding. In an ideal scenario for this new approach, negotiators from the state and the armed group in question meet in a place where a pilot development project could be set in motion. Separately, the government consults with local communities on these same initiatives. The armed group agrees to curb its use of violence, such as kidnapping, extortion and recruitment; allow state civilian officials full access to areas where it holds sway; and potentially enable the return of state security forces. The state, in turn, supports economic development projects, including in infrastructure, livelihoods and services, and agrees to reduce offensive military operations in the area. All these commitments are geographically specific and tailored to the needs of the community. 

Progress toward implementing this new methodology is mixed. The model is most advanced in talks with the FARC dissident faction known as Estado Mayor de los Bloques, which the EU is accompanying. Pilot projects are under way in Caquetá and Norte de Santander, with more to follow in Antioquia. Negotiations in the south-western department of Nariño with the Comuneros del Sur, an armed faction that broke from the ELN in early 2024, have secured an agreement from that group to hand over lethal weapons while the government establishes a legal mining district in the area, allowing artisanal miners to join the legal supply chain. The Comuneros have strong ties to the mining business, and they may believe they can earn more running operations legally than under the table. While truces in the Pacific cities of Buenaventura and Quibdó have hinged on gangs reducing violence in exchange for local investment, the state has been slow to fulfil its end of the bargain. Other processes are likely to adopt a similar approach. Talks with the Gaitanista Army, currently in an exploratory phase, may formally kick off with pilot projects in violence reduction in order to build trust between the sides, as Crisis Group has previously recommended.

Outside these peacebuilding ventures, security forces have been given a freer hand to combat armed and criminal groups. This move is sound: it will both help contain the worst eruptions of combat and restore targeted pressure on the groups sitting in talks. But it will take time to regain control and leverage, as military officers say they are struggling to keep up with the scale and breadth of the threats. Resources are being concentrated on priority objectives: for example, an offensive in Cauca against the FARC dissident faction Estado Mayor Central (EMC), which broke off from talks in April 2024. Yet the unintended consequence of this campaign appears to have left other areas with fewer resources. Military units just north of that operation, in Valle de Cauca, say they are short of personnel, equipment and overflight capacity. Armed groups are acutely aware of these limited state resources, which may be one reason why they seized on the distraction offered by the ELN’s January offensive to launch new military campaigns nationwide. A mid-level officer put it bluntly: “It is painful, but we have to admit that the threats have overtaken our ability to combat them. And if tomorrow there are no more negotiations, we will not have the capacity for a military response”.

The Importance of Civilian Protection

Petro’s new approach faces a gamut of challenges, beginning with the tight timeframe. Armed and criminal groups are gaining space faster than the government can conclude negotiations with them. Military resources are stretched, and the armed forces may not be able to hold off all armed threats at once or to keep any specific group in check before detailed peace arrangements have been agreed upon. If the government cannot achieve concrete security gains from talks in the near term, Petro’s successor in office is likely to calculate that abandoning unpopular negotiations is less costly than keeping them going. 

Bogotá will also need to take care to ensure that this new version of “total peace” does not end up inadvertently strengthening armed groups’ control of communities by making them appear to be the sponsors responsible for delivering state investment to the area. Lastly, localised negotiations run the risk of further splintering Colombia’s criminal landscape by encouraging internal factions to seek a better position by striking their own deals with Bogotá, as the Comuneros have done. Further schisms have already emerged over the last year, most significantly among FARC dissident groups, two of which began an all-out battle in the Amazon region in the wake of the ELN’s border offensive

Despite these hurdles, Bogota’s foreign partners should give another chance to “total peace”, if it can respond in a realistic, pragmatic way to security threats across the country. As a guarantor of the 2016 peace accord, and a longstanding supporter of human rights defenders and rural communities, the EU is well positioned to provide continued diplomatic support to the strategy. It can continue to help steer this delicate process toward achieving its most important goal: providing safety and relief for the civilian population. The EU is already playing this role formally in talks with the Estado Mayor de los Bloques and its frequent diplomatic presence, commitment to violence reduction in Quibdó and Buenaventura, and funding for local development have been vital in keeping talks on track. The EU can also help remind the Colombian government that current rural development efforts agreed upon in talks should be connected to commitments from the 2016 agreement.

Child combatants should be released as a priority in peace processes; once they are free, they will need a properly resourced program of support.

In the coming months, the EU’s voice will also be essential in ensuring that issues such as child recruitment and demobilisation remain at the heart of negotiations. Child combatants should be released as a priority in peace processes; once they are free, they will need a properly resourced program of support to enable them to return to civilian life. Furthermore, young people – especially girls – often face ostracism, stigma and social isolation when they put down their arms, placing them at greater risk of falling back into armed groups’ ranks. Drawing on the lessons of the 2016 peace agreement, reincorporation programs for these young people need to provide tailored approaches based on gender and ethnicity if they are to succeed. The newly launched National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which backs female participation in dialogue processes and post-conflict settings, among other goals, could also address some of these challenges if properly resourced. In talks with urban groups, it may also be a good moment to start thinking about how to create off-ramps for fighters in gangs who wish to demobilise. The EU can keep up pressure on state agencies to keep this and other government commitments, as well as help design and finance these initiatives. The delegation is also seeking to encourage more private-sector investment in rural development. The EU should also continue its irreplaceable support for civil society and the protection of human rights defenders, as well as funding for small grassroots livelihood projects in conflict-affected areas.

Separately, and in line with Petro’s two-pronged approach, the EU should consider how it can support the state in regaining territorial control and prosecuting those accused of criminal activities. A number of EU member states are already actively involved in training and providing equipment to security forces in their efforts to combat crime. The EU delegation could seek to help coordinate these efforts and engage with Colombian authorities about where there are gaps. The EU could also build on past work with the Attorney General’s office in strengthening its capacity to investigate violence against social leaders and reincorporated fighters, which could act as a starting point to provide further support for the judicial probes into conflict-related violent crime against civilians. Investigative police, state prosecutors and judges are all under-resourced, overloaded and often under threat themselves. They need technical and logistical support in order to fight impunity and provide justice for a much wider set of victims.

After two years of stumbles, the Petro government should now do its utmost to ensure that fighting does not escalate across the country. The government rightly realises that in Colombia’s current conflicts, an incremental approach rooted in an appreciation of local conditions will likely prove more effective than a sweeping national peace accord of the sort reached with the FARC nine years ago. It has also learned that military pressure is a critical part of the leverage that the state needs in order to negotiate with groups that are mostly interested in controlling criminal economies. Despite the current setbacks, myriad peace processes have demonstrated that negotiations are a necessary component of violence reduction in Colombia. The core challenges for “total peace” will now be to draw armed groups back from the path of violence and provide concrete improvements in security for civilians. 

Middle East and North Africa

Test Diplomacy with a Weakened Iran

The past half year has put Iran on the defensive. Israel has hammered the Islamic Republic’s non-state partners Hizbollah and Hamas, while damaging Iran’s own defences; with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Tehran also lost a longstanding ally. Discontent at home remains high and could again culminate in mass protests. Iran still has thousands of ballistic missiles that can reach places across the region, potent non-state allies in Yemen and Iraq, and its nuclear program, which is more advanced than ever. It has tightened links to Russia and China. Overall, though, the Islamic Republic is more exposed than it has been for decades. 

The big question is what the new U.S. administration will do. Iran hawks’ belief that now is the time to deal with Iran’s nuclear program or even the regime itself runs up against President Donald Trump’s determination not to get dragged into another Middle East war. A return to “maximum pressure” – tougher, more strictly enforced sanctions and military action against Iran’s non-state allies – seems likely, but whether its goal will be to squeeze Iran into giving things up or destabilise the regime itself is unclear. At the same time, Trump himself appears open to the prospect of a deal with the Islamic Republic – or at least he has not ruled it out – while Tehran, too, is signalling its interest in diplomatic engagement. That offers an opportunity to Western powers to test Iran’s willingness to make concessions, not just on the nuclear front, but according to an expanded agenda that includes its arms transfers to Russia and regional de-escalation. 

Europe’s relations with Iran are at a low ebb, due especially – though not solely – to Tehran’s support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. Still, European diplomats are in touch with their Iranian counterparts, and Europe has much to lose from Middle East escalation and the collapse of nuclear diplomacy. The EU, EU member states and UK, France and Germany (known in Iran diplomacy as the E3) should: 

  • Use their channels to both Tehran and Washington to scope out the contours of negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear issues, while signalling their readiness to trigger the “snapback” procedure in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which in 2015 lifted multilateral sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program, or impose additional targeted sanctions, if the Islamic Republic does not engage meaningfully in such negotiations;

  • If the new U.S. administration does move toward more aggressive sanctions, sanctions enforcement and military pressure on Iran, encourage it to link that strategy to defined and realistic ends; 

  • Build on their engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including via the EU special representative for the Gulf, to support growing cooperation between Iran and its neighbours to minimise escalation risks in the sub-region.

A member of the Basij paramilitary force under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) carries a scale model missile in a military rally in downtown Tehran, Iran, on January 10, 2025. Morteza Nikoubazl / NurPhoto via AFP

Iran’s Regional Weakness and High Nuclear Stakes

The past few months have pushed Iran onto the back foot, with its capacity to project power and deter adversaries sharply diminished across the Middle East. Israel’s campaign against Hizbollah, Iran’s main non-state ally, has decimated the Lebanese militant group’s upper echelons and much of its rank and file. Hamas is still a force in Gaza, but much of its military assets have been destroyed. Syrian rebels’ toppling of the Assad regime deprives Tehran of a state ally and a conduit for transferring arms to Hizbollah. Direct military exchanges with Israel, first in April 2024 and then that October, when Israel conducted major strikes, also damaged Iran’s own air defence systems and weapons production. Iran’s “axis of resistance”, which it saw as deterrence against Israeli or U.S. strikes on the Islamic Republic itself, is for now in tatters, with Tehran in its most vulnerable spot for some time. 

Still, Iran is far from powerless. It retains thousands of missiles (at least some of its barrages fired at Israel in April and October penetrated Israeli defences). The Houthis in Yemen remain a potent force, disrupting Red Sea shipping and extracting payoffs from shipping companies for safe passage. Allied militias in Iraq are still influential. Iran has strengthened ties to China and Russia, including through a recently signed partnership treaty with Moscow, and patched up its relations with Gulf Arab monarchies, in particular Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

Plus, Iran’s nuclear program is gathering steam. Multilateral diplomacy around limiting enrichment capacity and enhancing transparency based on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, collapsed in 2022. While Tehran ostensibly offered to take smaller steps to contain its enrichment capacity, they came to naught. It continues to build up a stockpile of enriched uranium, putting its breakout time – the time needed to amass a weapon’s worth of fissile material – at practically nil, though assembling a weapon and mounting it on a delivery system could take at least several more months. 

How the [Iranian] regime should respond to the losses it has suffered over the past year and domestic pressure is subject of intense debate within its governing system.

How the regime should respond to the losses it has suffered over the past year and domestic pressure is subject of intense debate within its governing system. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government presents itself as reformist, but it faces challenges ushering in major shifts in policy that could assuage disaffected Iranians. Conservatives who dominate parliament and retain oversight of unelected governing bodies are loath to give ground on cultural restrictions they deem to be at the core of the regime’s revolutionary ethos, particularly with regard to women’s rights. Corruption and mismanagement stymie an economy battered by U.S. sanctions, while the damage to “axis of resistance” partners underscored the high costs Tehran has incurred for a regional vision that has been hollowed out.

Some officials within Pezeshkian’s team, recognising the country’s unsustainable trajectory, voice interest in engaging Western capitals and appear to have the Supreme Leader’s blessing for such diplomacy if the opportunity arises. Despite Iran’s nuclear advances, the Supreme Leader for now still appears to hold out hope that Iran’s nuclear program is a way of getting sanctions relief from Western capitals and prefers not to pursue a nuclear bomb. He may also fear that if Iran dashes toward weaponisation, Israeli or U.S. intelligence would uncover the effort and act militarily against Iran’s nuclear facilities or the regime itself. Overall, for Iran’s more moderate camp, Iran’s deeper ties with non-Western powers are valuable but no substitute for the economic benefit that improved relations with the West could bring, particularly as returns from China and Russia have not always matched the lofty expectations. 

Still, plenty of people within the governing system argue against compromise, whether with the West or domestic critics, and calls for Iran to develop nuclear weapons are growing louder. Maintaining rigid doctrinal adherence to revolutionary values, rather than entertaining notions of socio-political reform and international détente, is a bedrock principle to hardliners. To them, weaponisation is increasingly attractive as a way to rebuild deterrence after the blows Iran has suffered. They also believe that Iran’s long-term diplomatic and economic strategy should give up on Europe and the U.S., focus instead on further improving relations with non-Western powers. 

U.S. Policy

What direction the Trump administration will adopt is unclear. Certainly, some within his circle – and some Israeli leaders – see in Iran’s weakness an opportunity to deal a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program or even to the regime itself. Such a blow might entail strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities dug deep into the mountains (which Israel could not carry out without heavy U.S. bombs) or efforts to destabilise the Islamic Republic. Such efforts would almost lead Tehran, seeing existential peril, to respond with what it has, whether missile barrages aimed at Israel, further attacks by the Houthis or Iraq-based militias or even strikes on Gulf oil facilities, which despite Tehran’s improved ties to the Gulf monarchies, it might launch as a last resort and which would cause global oil prices to spike. Gulf Arab leaders, who supported “maximum pressure” the last time around, caution against it this time, fearing they will end up in the firing line. 

Thankfully, for now, little suggests that Trump backs direct military action against Iran unless intelligence reveals that it is indeed moving toward weaponisation. More likely is a toughening of “maximum pressure” – tightening sanctions and perhaps some military action against Iran’s non-state allies. The escalatory risks of such a campaign would depend on what it entails and what its objectives are. If the goal is to press Iran into concessions that are beyond what its leaders can deliver, such as stopping uranium enrichment altogether, that, too, would also risk triggering an Iranian response, all the more so as Tehran would want to avoid being perceived as even weaker than it is.

Better would be to test diplomacy first, even if threatening extra pressure if it fails. At least some within Trump’s circle appear open to such an approach. Given its weakness, Tehran may be ready to consider concessions that were not on the table during previous talks, including its weapons supplies to Russia and even its support for Hizbollah and other militants, as well as strict controls on its nuclear program. Despite Israel’s successes against Iran over the past six months, trying to weaken the Islamic Republic further without at least first testing diplomacy would risk a backlash and might close the window for diplomacy that is open now.

Europe’s Options

During Trump’s first term, European leaders resisted his confrontational approach toward Iran, seeking to mitigate the fallout from what they viewed as an ill-conceived U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. This time around, European hostility to the Islamic Republic is fiercer, as Europe-Iran relations have deteriorated since 2022. Not only do European governments blame Tehran for the breakdown of nuclear talks. They are livid, too, about Iran’s provision of drones and missiles to Russia. They chafe as well at Iran’s human rights abuses at home, its detention of European nationals, its backing for the “axis of resistance” and its plots against dissidents on European soil. 

Still, Europe stands to gain little from another escalation in the Middle East, particularly at a time of uncertainty in the region. Iran’s position may be weakened, but it still has formidable assets to draw on. The EU and European governments have, on their own, few incentives to offer Tehran. Still, they could empower senior EU diplomats versed in both regional and non-proliferation issues to use channels in the U.S. and Iran to gauge the two sides’ readiness for diplomacy. In particular, EU officials, perhaps working with Gulf Arab counterparts, could test whether Tehran’s professed openness to renewed dialogue is sincere and what might be on the table – both in terms of Iran’s nuclear program and its foreign policy more broadly – and relay their findings to Washington. 

The diplomatic clock is already running. The E3 will be looking for major progress in any negotiations to reverse Iran’s nuclear expansion by mid-year in order to decide whether to trigger the “snapback” procedure in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which in 2015 lifted multilateral sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program. That clause can be triggered before October in the event of “significant non-performance” with respect to the terms of the deal, thereby reinstating UN sanctions (after October, Western power can no longer restore sanctions without Chinese and Russian support). Iran has threatened to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should the snapback occur, taking its nuclear program into uncharted terrain and potentially ending international visibility into its activities.

If the gap between what Iran offers and the Trump administration considers sufficient to enter talks is too wide, little would be lost in making the effort.

If Iran and the U.S. are ready to enter talks, the goal should be not only quelling nuclear concerns – at the very minimum, dialling back enrichment and stockpiles of uranium at near weapons grade and giving UN inspectors improved access to its program – but also Iran’s support for Hizbollah, the Houthis and other militant groups and its weapons supplies to Russia, likely in exchange not only for sanctions relief but for U.S. pledges that it will not seek to destabilise the regime. Israel might well oppose such a deal, but it would stand to gain. A bargain along those lines may seem fanciful but a better moment for diplomacy is unlikely to arise any time soon. Besides, if the gap between what Iran offers and the Trump administration considers sufficient to enter talks is too wide, little would be lost in making the effort.

If Trump does ramp up “maximum pressure”, Europe’s focus should be on pressing the U.S. administration to see it as part of a strategy aimed at delivering a diplomatic win, rather than as an end in itself. European leaders would, in other words, do what they can to push Washington to outline what it wants from Iran, urging that its demands be within the realms of what is feasible and can serve as a basis for negotiations. 

Whatever happens, increased European engagement with the GCC, underscored by the first EU-GCC summit held in October 2024, offers an opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation in the Gulf. The EU can help strengthen the constructive improvement in Tehran’s relations with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi by offering support and technical expertise for regional initiatives on issues like environmental cooperation, thus helping consolidate the transition from rivalry to rapprochement.

Toward a Stronger European Stand on Israel-Palestine

The ceasefire in Gaza comes as an enormous relief to Palestinians and Israelis alike. In the fifteen months following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack in southern Israel, more than 46,000 Palestinians were killed, according to Gaza authorities (other estimates are higher), with untold numbers of others still buried under the rubble, as Israel pursued its military campaign aimed at destroying the Islamist group. The assault pushed most of the strip’s 2.3 million residents out of their homes, with many displaced several times, amid conditions that the UN warned in November 2024 were approaching famine. Meanwhile, 94 of the remaining hostages Hamas and other groups took during the 7 October 2023 assault languished in captivity, as their families in Israel pleaded with the government to speed their release. On 19 January, three women were freed, along with 90 Palestinians who were being held in Israeli jails, as the long-awaited truce came into effect. More hostage-prisoner exchanges have followed, and they are due to continue. 

The ceasefire is welcome but fragile, for reasons Crisis Group has previously adduced. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has suggested it will resume the war after the truce’s first phase, while manoeuvres by the Israeli army during the war position it to directly reoccupy parts of the strip indefinitely. The army altered the strip’s demographics and geography, concentrating most Palestinians in the south while carving out military corridors and buffer zones. As part of the ceasefire’s first phase, Israel has pledged to pull its army out of all but a buffer zone inside Gaza, along the perimeter with Israel. On 27 January, Israeli troops partly withdrew from the Netzarim corridor, which bisects Gaza, and tens of thousands of displaced Palestinians returned to the north, which suggests it will be harder for Israel to restart its military campaign. Still, whether it will complete the pullout is unclear, as is how much the new Trump administration, whose pressure on Israel arguably pushed the ceasefire deal over the line, will do to make that happen. Hamas, though weakened, remains the dominant Palestinian force in Gaza – which is anathema to many Israelis. 

In the West Bank, the Israeli government ... has been expanding settlements.

In the West Bank, the Israeli government, which includes far-right ministers from the settler movement, has been expanding settlements, with the pace accelerating after 7 October 2023. Tensions in the West Bank have spiked, with a number of Palestinian attacks on Israelis, Israeli army raids and sieges in pursuit of militants, growing waves of settler violence, expulsion of Palestinians from their villages and further restrictions on Palestinian movement – all of which intensified following the Gaza ceasefire. Israel, which has been de facto annexing the West Bank, may be aiming to formally annex parts of the territory, in fulfilment of the settler right’s long-time ambition.

Europe has tended to deal with Gaza and the West Bank separately, particularly since Israel withdrew its settlements and soldiers from the strip in 2005. The differences in Israeli policy toward the two, however, seem to be diminishing. In material terms, decimated Gaza is by far the worse off of the two territories. Yet, in some ways, Gaza and the West Bank mirror each other. During the war, the Israeli army increased the scale of bombardment in and fragmented both territories; even should the ceasefire hold, Israel has indicated it will continue to hold buffer zones in Gaza. Israeli leaders are on record saying they want to prevent a Palestinian state in either of these territories, so as to realise their vision of a “greater Israel”, and some assert they want to rebuild settlements in Gaza. The Knesset overwhelmingly endorsed a declarative resolution against Palestinian statehood in June 2024. The Gaza ceasefire notwithstanding, Israel is on a path to reshape and strengthen its control of both territories, diminishing hopes for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Hamstrung by internal divisions and deferential to Washington, the EU consistently has failed to muster political influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, notwithstanding its longstanding support for a two-state solution and aid to Palestinians. Now Israel is explicitly pursuing policies seemingly meant to permanently foreclose Palestinian self-determination, directly challenging the EU’s stated vision for the region. The new U.S. administration’s approach remains uncertain but, though President Donald Trump threw his weight behind the Gaza ceasefire, his team may well abet at least some of the Israeli government’s expansionist agenda. Indeed, on 26 January, Trump himself suggested he had pressed Egypt and Jordan to take in more Palestinian refugees. If Brussels is to find its voice, now is the time.

If Europe can go at least some way to overcoming its divisions, the EU and member states should: 

  • Push for the swiftest and most effective means of delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza so as to bolster the ceasefire. European capitals should press Israel and Egypt to loosen screening procedures for aid trucks. They could also consider promoting the creation of a maritime aid corridor to Gaza from Europe, in coordination with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. They should continue to press Israel to allow the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Gaza’s most established and capable aid provider, to continue its vital operations by declining to enforce two laws that in effect bar the life-sustaining agency from Israel and the occupied territories.

  • Use the forthcoming 23 February meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council, the EU’s highest political platform for discussions with partner countries, to signal to the Israeli government that the EU opposes entrenchment of Israeli rule in the occupied territories. Ideally – though admittedly several states oppose doing so – the EU would stress that suspension of certain provisions in the EU-Israel Association Agreement is on the table unless Israel withdraws from Gaza, in line with the terms of phase one of the ceasefire agreement (assuming that Hamas also fulfils its side of the bargain), and Israel enters meaningful dialogue about how to make progress on concerns in the West Bank as well. 

  • Use the first-ever High-Level Political Dialogue between the EU and the Palestinian Authority (PA), planned for March, to press the PA to reach an agreement for a temporary Palestinian administration, comprising independent officials supported by all Palestinian factions, to oversee reconstruction and governance in Gaza. Brussels can encourage the PA’s compliance by issuing warnings that it could freeze development aid and offers of statehood recognition.

  • Given the International Court of Justice’s 19 July 2024 advisory opinion regarding the illegality of Israel’s military occupation, the EU should also consider expanding sanctions to target larger, more central Israeli institutions and officials involved in the West Bank settlement enterprise, including senior government ministers and financial bodies involved in directing or enabling settlement activities.

Palestinians carry belongings amidst building rubble in a ruined neighbourhood of Gaza’s southern city of Rafah on January 20, 2025, as residents return following a ceasefire deal a day earlier between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas group. BASHAR TALEB / AFP

Gaza’s Altered Landscape

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza reshaped the strip’s social and political landscape. Intensive Israeli bombardment ruined or badly damaged some two thirds of Gaza’s buildings, including an estimated 90 per cent of its housing units, as well as much of its agricultural land and many of its water sources, rendering large parts of the strip uninhabitable. The army dug into the Philadelphi corridor, a narrow buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border, with Netanyahu insisting that it would remain under Israeli control. It also cut across the strip with the Netzarim corridor, just south of Gaza City. Lastly, the army expanded a pre-existing buffer zone along the strip’s northern and eastern boundaries with Israel. 

The scale of destruction is greatest in northern Gaza, where Israel conducted several offensives to root out Hamas fighters, particularly from Jabalya refugee camp and the nearby towns of Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Israeli forces laid waste to these locales, forcing 300,000-400,000 residents to move southward and leaving those who stayed on the brink of dying from starvation On 8 November 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification warned there was a “strong likelihood that famine is imminent” in parts of northern Gaza. 

The ceasefire has likely staved off the worse scenarios, but hunger remains a cause for alarm.

The ceasefire has likely staved off the worse scenarios, but hunger remains a cause for alarm. According to the deal, an average of 600 aid trucks per day are to enter Gaza during the truce’s 42-day first phase. The UN said 630 and 915 trucks got in on the ceasefire’s first and second days, respectively, but crucial questions remain as to who can dole out the aid over the long haul. The most capable distributor would be UNRWA, the humanitarian body supporting Palestinian refugees and a lifeline for Gaza’s population writ large. On 28 October, however, the Knesset passed two laws in effect banning UNRWA, which are set to enter force on 30 January. 

Israel says other UN bodies could and already are assuming UNRWA’s duties, but this claim misses the agency’s unique nature. For 75 years, UNRWA has served as a quasi-governmental institution, providing education, health care and employment for much of the local population. Beyond its role as a service provider, it represents the world’s recognition of Palestinian displacement and embodies Palestinian national aspirations and rights. While other agencies might eventually be able to deliver aid, Gaza’s beleaguered population cannot afford the period of adjustment that would require, and no evident alternative for other basic services exists.

The truce does not talk about policing in the strip. During much of the war, aid trucks that did make it into the enclave faced looting by armed criminal gangs. It is unclear who will protect the larger convoys now. If looting continues, and if UNRWA is prohibited from playing its accustomed distribution role, hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians living in tents with little clean water, shivering in winter cold and suffering from disease could still face difficulties getting enough food. In the weeks before the truce, a number of infants froze to death, while malnutrition was hindering breastfeeding and formula was scarce. Without reliable supplies and aid providers familiar with local conditions, such tragedies could recur.

Other big questions concern control of territory. The ceasefire terms allow Palestinians from northern Gaza to go back to their homes (or what is left of them), and many have returned. For the time being, the truce has quieted fears that Israel will either hold the north as a depopulated military zone or, as some Israeli politicians advocated, rebuild settlements there. But the north is not the only place in the strip the army holds. According to the ceasefire deal, Israeli troops are to vacate the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors, along with any other part of Gaza except the buffer along its northern and eastern perimeter, by the end of the first phase. On 27 January, Israel partly withdrew troops from the Netzarim corridor, though Netanyahu has claimed that they do not have to leave Philadelphi, in response to criticism of the deal from the Israeli far right. Should he refuse to pull the army out of this area, the truce would be imperilled.

Annexing the West Bank

In the shadow of the military campaign in Gaza, Israel sped up its settlement project in the West Bank. It has set up a record number of 52 settler outposts, seven of them in Area B (the parts of the West Bank that, under the 1993-1995 Oslo accords, fall under Palestinian civil administration and Israeli military control), the first such development since those agreements. The settlement drive previously had focused on what the Oslo accords called Area C, which makes up 60 per cent of the West Bank and where all 500,000 Israeli settlers reside (not including East Jerusalem). According to the UN, some 300 Palestinian households comprising 1,762 people, including 856 children, have been forcibly displaced from Area C since 7 October 2023 by Israeli military and settler attacks, as well as by access restrictions imposed by the army.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also serves as the West Bank’s de facto governor, has stated that 2025 will be the year in which Israel achieves full sovereignty over the territory. In addition to expediting settlement construction, Smotrich is supervising bureaucratic and political changes that are transferring authority in the West Bank from military officers to civilian government officials. The agency in charge, the Settlement Administration, is headed by a civilian official whose agenda is solely to serve the needs of the West Bank’s Jewish population. Smotrich has also mentioned plans to force the PA’s collapse as well as to dissolve Israel’s Civil Administration, the arm of the military that oversees Palestinian civilian life. Targeting these two entities – which the Israeli defence establishment largely seeks to preserve – suggests that at least parts of the Israeli government are working not only to thwart a future Palestinian state but also to keep uprooting Palestinians from large parts of the West Bank.

The PA ... is staggering from years of mismanagement, dwindling foreign aid and Israel’s punitive withholding of tax revenues.

The PA is ripe for a fatal blow. It is staggering from years of mismanagement, dwindling foreign aid and Israel’s punitive withholding of tax revenues, which have further hurt the West Bank economy during the Gaza war. The war – and now the ceasefire, which Hamas is portraying as a victory – have diminished the popularity of the PA, which largely works with Israel, vis-à-vis the Islamist group and others preaching armed resistance to the Israeli occupation. Mahmoud Abbas, entering his twentieth year as PA president, continues to block efforts at reconciliation between his party Fatah and Hamas, even thwarting the formation of an independent committee to govern Gaza with Hamas’s support. Since December, PA security forces have been moving to suppress armed groups in the West Bank city and refugee camp of Jenin, in coordination with the Israeli army, further eroding the PA’s legitimacy. Despite chalking up a few diplomatic victories by persuading other countries to recognise Palestinian statehood, the PA is widely seen among Palestinians as derelict in its duties or complicit in the occupation. Nonetheless, its demise would not only imperil basic services for the 3.2 million Palestinians in the West Bank but also stability in the territory, potentially increasing violence against Israel itself, the Israeli army and settlers.

Whether or not Israel moves to annex the West Bank formally, it is rapidly remaking the area in ways that will require a great deal of political capital to reverse, and the new U.S. administration may not do much to curb its activities. Trump and his Middle East envoy Stephen Witkoff appear to have leaned on Israel to conclude the Gaza ceasefire agreement, and some on his foreign policy team appear still to hold out hope for a normalisation deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia that, for now, Riyadh insists would require Palestinian statehood first. On the other hand, senior people in his administration, among them Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee and Ambassador to the UN Elise Stefanik, have promoted their belief that Israel has a biblical right to the entire West Bank. Signals thus far suggest that the administration will do little to stem and might even encourage Israeli settlement expansion and annexation. In one of his first acts as U.S. president, Trump lifted sanctions on violent settlers imposed by his predecessor Joe Biden’s executive order of 1 February 2024. Netanyahu, too, has appointed a new ambassador to the U.S., Yechiel Leiter, who strongly advocates annexing the West Bank and dismantling the PA. 

A Firmer European Stance

As European governments are deeply divided over Israel-Palestine, the EU has been unable to put together a united front to protect prospects for a two-state solution. Europe has often played a subordinate role in diplomacy, exemplified over the past year during the ceasefire talks, which were led by the U.S. and Arab states. 

Given the disagreements in Brussels, several European states have taken unilateral steps over the past year to press for a stronger European approach. Ireland, Norway (not an EU member), Sweden and Slovenia in 2024 recognised the State of Palestine, and others might follow suit. Most EU members have committed, at least rhetorically, to enforce the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged crimes during the Gaza war. The EU has imposed sanctions on certain settler organisations and individuals. Some European capitals are considering sanctioning Smotrich and other settler leaders and institutions, including settler regional councils.

The immediate task is to keep the Gaza ceasefire on track, at least through its first phase and ideally to completion. The EU, which has long supplied vital funds for humanitarian aid to Gaza, should redouble efforts to make sure adequate assistance reaches the many Palestinians in need. European support will be especially critical in light of the gap seemingly left by the Trump administration, which on 20 January ordered a 90-day suspension of all U.S. aid. The ceasefire has eased aid delivery, but obstacles remain. The EU can urge both Egypt and Israel to relax inspections that –during the war – held up aid convoys, which have usually already undergone monitoring from UN and other international organisations. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas announced on 27 January that EU foreign ministers agreed to redeploy its Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Rafah crossing, which can help smooth out operations further. The EU can also consider opening a maritime corridor to Gaza, in cooperation with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. Crucially, the EU should impress upon Israel that it should allow UNRWA to continue its functions in Gaza and the West Bank.

It should also push Israel to continue withdrawing from Gaza, including the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors, in line with the ceasefire agreement’s first-phase terms, to ensure the viability of the strip’s recovery and reconstruction, and to pave the way for Palestinian self-governance with international assistance. Looking to the West Bank, the EU should put more pressure on Israel to halt settlement expansion, a policy which is in violation of international law, perpetuates violence and kills off prospects of Palestinian self-determination. 

Whether the EU can shake off its disunity and act more decisively ... remains unclear.

True, little for now suggests that Europe can overcome the divisions that have stopped past efforts to sway Israel from gathering momentum. That the EU’s heavyweight, Germany, numbers among Israel’s most significant economic and military backers and a handful of other European states are arguably even more supportive of Israel complicates collective action. Beyond individual sanctions, the EU, collectively, has refrained from using concrete leverage with Israel, notably that linked to trade and economic cooperation. Whether the EU can shake off its disunity and act more decisively – particularly if Washington backs behind settlement expansion or West Bank annexation, and Israel stalls on subsequent phases of the Gaza ceasefire – remains unclear. 

The forthcoming EU-Israel Association Council in February offers a chance to signal a tougher European stance to the Israeli government. The International Court of Justice’s July 2024 advisory opinion could serve as a basis for pursuing stronger measures against illegal activities like settlement construction. There are other options, too, some of which do not require consensus: prior to the Gaza ceasefire, top officials, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, floated the prospect of withholding certain arms transfers on grounds that Israel may be using these weapons in violation of international humanitarian law.

While pushing back on Israel’s entrenching occupation, accountability must also be applied to the PA. At its High-Level Dialogue in March, the EU must insist that President Abbas demonstrate the PA’s ability to govern not merely through the capacity of its security forces, but through political pluralism and sound economic management. Brussels can start by pledging assistance to an independent Palestinian committee to manage Gaza’s reconstruction, whose formation is being negotiated under Egyptian mediation (and undermined by Abbas). This committee will not be controlled by Hamas but will require its acquiescence – an uncomfortable notion for EU members, given its designation as a terrorist group and its responsibility for the 7 October 2023 assault, but the only viable path to integrating what survives of Gaza’s governing infrastructure and to deterring local security threats to a PA-led administration. The EU can demand guardrails for transparency to ensure that its funds are being used appropriately and in compliance with EU laws.

If the U.S. does more assertively back Israel’s annexation of the West Bank, Europe should do what it can to preserve space for an eventual negotiated settlement, including robust support for Palestinian civil society and concrete measures that impose costs on Israel for foreclosing peace prospects. These steps would defy U.S. preferences and likely invite countermeasures. But sustained engagement of this sort could help preserve public attention, support Palestinian life and livelihoods in the occupied territories, and stop Palestinian aspirations for self-determination from being extinguished.

Promoting a Stable, Peaceful Transition in Syria

A lightning offensive led by Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist rebel group, has ended the Assad dynasty’s brutal 54-year rule and a decade of bloody civil war, seeding cautious hope among Syrians for a better future. HTS has largely adopted the right tone in its statements, acknowledging Syria’s religious, political and cultural diversity and pledging that its caretaker cabinet will work to bring about a more inclusive transitional government. 

Yet the new leadership in Damascus faces formidable challenges in a country recovering from civil war, especially in areas outside the capital. Less disciplined armed factions and unaffiliated gunmen have started exploiting gaps in HTS policing to loot and sow fear. In central and western Syria, these groups have targeted individuals whom they associate with the deposed regime, particularly Alawites and members of other minorities, which has fuelled perceptions within these communities that they are under attack. Left unchecked, this activity could generate renewed cycles of retaliatory violence reminiscent of the civil war. Tensions are also high in the north east, where the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have held sway for the past decade. Turkish-backed armed groups have driven the SDF out of several towns, displacing hundreds. More fighting could uproot thousands more, putting further strain on the post-Assad transition. In addition, the SDF’s weakening could allow ISIS – which is already reorganising in Syria’s eastern desert – to resurge. Hanging over this tableau are the international sanctions imposed in the Assad era, including terrorism designations placed on the leadership now in charge of the country, which continue to obstruct Syria’s economic recovery and hinder effective governance.

To promote a peaceful transition in Syria, the EU and its member states should: 

  • Continue to use exchanges with the new authorities in Damascus to stress the importance of reflecting Syria’s rich political, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in the caretaker government and within the security forces, and through active political participation by all parts of society. 

  • Work with the U.S. to support negotiations between the Damascus leadership and the SDF to reach a stable solution in the north east that also addresses Türkiye’s security concerns, including through high-level engagement with Ankara. 

  • Emphasise the importance of preserving the international anti-ISIS coalition, with the Syrian government’s cooperation, to prevent ISIS and other jihadists from regrouping in Syria. 

  • Continue to repatriate European citizens affiliated with ISIS who remain stranded in detention facilities in north-eastern Syria. 

  • Clarify the terms of the roadmap announced on 27 January and define specific criteria that Syria’s authorities must meet to secure further sanctions easing and/or to avoid snapback.

A man cycles past armed security personnel stationed outside a government building in As Sanamayn, Daraa, Syria, on January 9, 2025. Bilal Alhammoud / Middle East Images via AFP

Political and Security Challenges

Many rebel groups participated in the eleven-day blitz that ousted the Assad regime, but HTS was the clear leader. Weeks after marching into Damascus, HTS established a caretaker government made up of figures who had occupied similar positions in its self-titled Salvation Government in the north-western enclave of Idlib, where the group had for years carved out a de facto autonomous zone. It has also announced plans to hold a national dialogue conference in the coming weeks to launch a broader political transition. The interim authorities continue to enjoy public support, for the most part, though security challenges and concerns about ideological overreach by some among the new leadership have begun to emerge.

HTS acknowledges that the interim cabinet draws on a fairly narrow cultural and ideological base, rooted in conservative Islamists from Idlib, although its cadres argue that appointing officials who are familiar with one another allows for faster, more effective decision-making at a critical juncture for the country. Syrians across the ideological spectrum, and particularly the more liberal voices, are nonetheless wary of HTS’s conservative Islamist leanings and of the caretaker government’s limited diversity. Some, including an HTS spokesperson, have advocated restricting women’s political role; he said women lack the authority to serve as judges. While HTS quickly replaced him, such comments could harm the new leadership’s credibility with Syrians who have yet to be won over by its talk of inclusion. Another figure whose appointment has affected public confidence is the interim justice minister, who in 2015 presided over the execution of two women in Idlib on charges of “prostitution”. 

Fostering greater trust and a more diverse set of political and social relationships will be essential for the interim leadership.

HTS has promised that the caretaker government will be in charge only until 1 March, but uncertainty about what may come next has jangled nerves. Fostering greater trust and a more diverse set of political and social relationships will be essential for the interim leadership as it seeks to rebuild Syria and address the country’s many challenges. 

Security, meanwhile, stands out as an immediate concern. Damascus remains largely safe, but beyond the capital conditions are more alarming. Reports of instances of violence, looting and harassment are surfacing, as unruly armed factions and unaffiliated gunmen are taking advantage of the power vacuum for economic gain and to take revenge on wartime foes. 

In areas with substantial minority populations, such as the Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia provinces, these incidents have a particularly destabilising impact, especially where Sunni and Alawite villages and neighbourhoods sit side by side. The Assad regime disproportionately recruited from the Alawite community to staff its security forces and military, especially at senior levels, and individuals have been targeted in retribution for alleged complicity in the deposed government’s crimes. Local armed groups outside HTS control have been implicated in several killings and kidnappings. Witnesses usually cannot say who committed these crimes, as distinguishing among the various factions is difficult. Compounding pre-existing sectarian tensions, these incidents have fuelled perceptions that entire communities are under attack.

While HTS has acted to improve security, its forces appear to be stretched thin. In many cases, the Damascus authorities have reined in violent factions, arresting perpetrators, but their efforts are often reactive. HTS’s forces, which number approximately 30,000 fighters, are in urgent need of more personnel and resources. HTS has announced plans to dissolve former rebel factions and integrate them into a national army, which would represent an important advance. Meanwhile, HTS is enrolling new police officers in most provinces, but recruiting and training staff will take time. 

Engaging local communities in security provision could address personnel shortages while also promoting more inclusive and representative law enforcement. In Druze-majority Suwayda province, where factions have mostly supported the HTS-led offensive, the caretaker government has delegated security provision to local forces; Suwayda residents told Crisis Group that security in the area has improved following Assad’s fall. But in the absence of trusted partners, HTS has yet to engage local communities in central and western Syria in efforts to improve security in their areas. Community leaders in these regions have nevertheless expressed willingness to cooperate, and they could provide essential knowledge and intelligence to curb current levels of insecurity. 

Handling Potential Spoilers

Former regime members have tried to exploit the weak ties between HTS and Alawite communities, though with mixed results. In Tartous, HTS attempted to apprehend the former head of the notorious Sednaya prison – the Assad regime’s main jail for political prisoners, which HTS liberated – leading to clashes that killed fourteen of its members. Without prior communication between HTS and locals, former regime members managed to spread claims that HTS was coming to attack the village, rallying local supporters to join in its defence. In other cases, where HTS coordinated with local representatives, such operations proved more successful. In the countryside west of Homs, for example, HTS arrested a regime-affiliated former gang leader and members without putting the civilian population at risk. Local villagers did not cooperate with the gang, instead providing HTS with intelligence to ensure their capture. The contrast highlights the importance of effective cooperation with locals to restore order. Without urgent corrective measures, fears of violence and exclusion from the new political and social order could even encourage minorities to form armed self-defence groups. 

In a country just emerging from over a decade of sectarian civil war, the road from self-defence to insurgency could be short and disastrous.

Another threat to security comes from the thousands of members of the ousted regime’s army, who are now unemployed but many still armed, while some of them have access to weapons circulating in the country. Under current conditions, many former soldiers report being unwilling to lay down their guns; some even say they are acquiring new ones to protect themselves. In a country just emerging from over a decade of sectarian civil war, the road from self-defence to insurgency could be short and disastrous. 

Endemic instability could also encourage external actors to capitalise. Iran and Hizbollah, which maintain ties with prominent Assad-era figures, could try to undermine Syria’s transition. Israel could also aggravate instability. Driven by its security concerns after Assad’s fall, Israel launched a sweeping bombing campaign, destroying Syrian military assets and chemical weapons production facilities. Its forces also invaded southern Syria to occupy a buffer zone beyond that established by the 1974 disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights. Within this area, Israel has seized strategic positions, carried out disarmament efforts and even targeted HTS forces sent to a village to de-escalate local clashes. These actions risk further destabilising an already fragile region and complicating efforts by Damascus to consolidate power. 

Escalating Conflict in the North East

Syria’s north east, controlled by the Kurdish-led SDF, has become another fount of instability. After HTS launched its offensive, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advanced into SDF-held areas, capturing several towns from the SDF, displacing thousands of civilians. The SDF, in turn, announced a counter-offensive to recapture lost areas in late December 2024. Ankara views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it (along with the EU and the U.S.) labels a terrorist organisation and has fought for decades. Ankara sees the group’s presence in north-eastern Syria as a threat to Turkish national security. Continued escalation between the SNA and the SDF risks compelling tens of thousands more civilians to flee their homes.

The SDF’s critical role in containing ISIS adds to the stakes. The SDF is responsible for guarding facilities housing detained ISIS militants and their families, including some 50,000 people in al-Hol, a camp near the Iraqi border which also hosts thousands of European citizens. A weakening of the SDF could enable prison breaks and create conditions for an ISIS resurgence. Already, the jihadist group is exploiting the power vacuum to reorganise and bolster its forces from hideouts in the eastern desert. The U.S. and France, which have garrisons in the north east as part of the anti-ISIS coalition and strongly back the SDF, have stepped up airstrikes on suspected ISIS targets. 

The Assad regime’s fall presents an opportunity to reunify Syrian territory. The new rulers in Damascus have announced their intention to do so, under a single government, with all armed factions integrated into a single national army. So far, the SDF appears open to this project in principle, but hesitant in practice. It has made clear that its decision on integration will depend on what governance model the new rulers adopt and what sort of guarantees Damascus offers for protecting Kurdish rights. In any case, reconnecting the north east with the central government will require extensive negotiations with support from Washington and Brussels. 

Sanctions: A Barrier to Recovery

Syria’s new leaders face the monumental task of rebuilding an economy in ruins after over a decade of conflict and mismanagement. While the Assad regime’s demise has created an opportunity for renewal, the legacy of sanctions imposed by the EU, the U.S. and others remains a major obstacle. The EU’s Syria sanctions regime is currently the bloc’s second-largest, after the one imposed on Russia, consisting of a wide range of sectoral sanctions, from the financial sector to aviation, telecommunications and petrol. These measures now risk starving the new government in Damascus of the resources it needs to shore up national institutions. Without adjustments, sanctions could stifle efforts to consolidate government authority and deliver critical state services. On 27 January, the EU announced an agreement on a roadmap to ease sanctions on Syria – a welcome first step. Yet the roadmap lacks clarity as to the scope of restrictions to be relaxed and the timeline for doing so, as well as clear benchmarks for Syria’s new leaders to meet in order to avoid reinstatement of the sanctions.

The U.S., EU and UN list HTS as a terrorist organisation, which adds a layer of complexity to the problem. The group has long since distanced itself from ISIS and al-Qaeda, its former ties with which caused the sanctions to be imposed, and actively fought these groups in Idlib. Nonetheless, the terrorist designations remain. The U.S. designation of HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is particularly onerous because it bars providing assistance and advice as well as funding to the group. The penalties for violations are also especially severe. That an FTO-listed group is now acting as Syria’s de facto government complicates foreign companies’ and aid workers’ dealings in the country, adding legal risks and administrative burdens. The EU’s terrorist designation of HTS has less sweeping implications, but it still has an impact, as it prohibits making funds available to those listed, either directly or indirectly, and contributes to the broader chilling effect on interactions in the country. It is unclear whether the EU’s roadmap will include concrete steps HTS could take to be delisted.

Without adjustments, sanctions risk blocking the country’s economic recovery and keeping it overly reliant on contraband.

Without adjustments, sanctions risk blocking the country’s economic recovery and keeping it overly reliant on contraband. Many Syrians turned to smuggling after the imposition of sanctions in 2011, and illicit industries have been among the country’s few sources of profit ever since. The Assad regime was particularly dependent on trade in the amphetamine Captagon to stay afloat. Drug smuggling networks have weakened following their patron’s ouster, but they might regain strength if Syria remains cut off from international markets. Enduring isolation would not only perpetuate illicit activity but also create opportunities for foreign and extremist groups to recruit.

Lastly, if the new leadership cannot revive the economy, hardship could again push Syrians to look for better life chances abroad. Significant emigration would not only strain neighbouring and European countries, some of which already host large Syrian refugee populations, but also prevent many Syrians in the diaspora from returning to their homeland.

What the EU and Its Member States Can Do

Europe has an important role to play in giving the post-Assad transition its best chance at success. In engaging with the new authorities in Damascus, the EU should emphasise the importance of inclusion. Defining and assessing the inclusiveness of Syria’s interim governing authorities will undoubtedly be a challenging task for outsiders. But Syrians have developed an impressive range of civil society organisations, both within and outside the country. Civil society is immersed in debates about governance and is already pushing back against certain steps taken by the HTS. The EU should provide financial support to civil society and opposition voices, enabling them to keep playing a vital role in Syria’s transition and future. It could also offer additional technical assistance to build Syrian state capacity. The EU should stress the need to respond to public concern about the new leadership’s approach to women’s rights, including by urging the authorities to keep appointing women to leadership roles and to widen their engagement with women’s movements. 

As for local security, police forces under the former regime used to have a reputation for petty corruption and inefficiency, but otherwise they were mostly uninvolved in the central government’s misdeeds. The EU could encourage authorities to organise joint patrols made up of HTS general security personnel and vetted former regime police as a way to get enough boots on the ground at this critical time for the country’s transition, while preserving discipline and accountability.

In the north east, the EU and member states that belong to the anti-ISIS coalition should promote the SDF’s integration into central government institutions, starting with the army. The EU should support negotiations between the Damascus leadership and the SDF, working with the U.S. to nudge them toward a stable solution in the north east that also addresses Türkiye’s security concerns, including through further high-level engagement with Ankara. The SDF, under pressure from Türkiye and the SNA factions it sponsors, is more willing than before to negotiate. Likewise, the central government, which is not strong enough to dictate terms, may adopt a conciliatory approach. The threat of an ISIS resurgence, for now at least, means that international coalition troops should stay in north-eastern Syria. EU member states should consider repatriating their citizens from ISIS detention camps like al-Hol to reduce the strain on the SDF and contribute to regional stability. 

The EU should ... take immediate steps to alleviate the ill effects of sanctions on Syria’s economy.

The EU should also take immediate steps to alleviate the ill effects of sanctions on Syria’s economy. First, the bloc should lift sectoral sanctions, as EU diplomats have hinted that they plan to do, which obstruct Syrian economic regeneration and were imposed in response to the Assad regime’s atrocities. The EU should ensure that the timeline for review or snapback is not too short, so that humanitarian and commercial activity can start in earnest. Secondly, for the sanctions that remain in place, it should put a standing humanitarian waiver in place. This waiver would ideally extend to the private sector so as to kickstart the commercial activity needed to staunch Syria’s humanitarian crisis. Thirdly, the EU should clarify the terms of the roadmap announced on 27 January and define specific criteria that Syria’s authorities can meet for further sanctions easing and/or to avoid a snapback. These criteria should above all make it costly for Syria’s new authorities to resort to autocratic and repressive rule. 

With the UN estimating that 33 million Syrians both inside the country and in places of refuge in neighbouring countries will require assistance in 2025 due to the civil war and its aftermath, it will be crucial to scale up humanitarian aid for the foreseeable future. While foreign aid may provide short-term relief, it cannot sustain an entire country. Syria urgently needs not only emergency supplies but also support for economic recovery. The private sector, wary of continued instability and punishment for inadvertently breaking sanctions, needs active encouragement from major powers in order to regain the confidence to invest in Syria. Meanwhile, European governments should remain realistic about the prospects of refugee return. To make return safe, the current security challenges have to be addressed; to make it viable, basic services need to be restored and the prospect of economic recovery needs to be credible.

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